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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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EAST EUROPE REPORT

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSSR ATTEMPTS TO 'NORMALIZE' ROCK GROUPS

Vienna GEGENSTIMMEN in German Winter 1983 pp 2-6

[Article by Andres Csepel: "No Future for Punks?"]

[Text] In 1976 the show trial and the sentence against the "plastic people of the universe" destroyed the Czechoslovak underground rock scene. The media paid considerable attention to the proceedings, and the elimination of the group was of great significance for the policy of "normalization"--not perhaps because the band had ever constituted a serious threat to the regime but because the alternative rock music scene had the potential of becoming a great point of attraction and fertile soil for unorthodox ideas and attitudes within the crucial social stratum about which the "normalizers" were so concerned--the young people.

From 1976 to 1981 pop music was kept under surveillance by the notoriously conservative cultural bureaucracy. Apart from a brief deviation in the late seventies, this meant that rock music lacked all dynamism and spontaneity. The apparathiks with the power to judge what was and what was not admissible had only a limited knowledge of the musical genre, and of course their main criterion for determining their policy was the artists' political reliability. While considerable resources were invested in popular music, rock music remained the Cinderella of the industry since even the most reliable, clinically pure rock somehow was regarded as a threat to cultural stability.

The radio stations and record stores of Czechoslovakia overflow with second-rate, mediocre material meant to encourage a consumer's attitude which--exactly like the music--has been imported by the regime from the West. The money being made available to rock bands has to be divided among a small elite of artists. The three most popular pop bands--Olympus, Abraxus and Catapult--recall a fairly subdued American hard rock of the early seventies and have also been clearly influenced by the British Deep Purple and Uriah Heep groups. Even these officially blessed bands can run into difficulties. Catapult, which enjoys great support among young people ranging from age 15 to 18 have been banned from playing in Prague for some time and recently have been prohibited from performing in central Bohemia.

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One of the most disturbing aspects of official policy toward rock music is to discriminate against certain artists not only because of their political but because of their musical qualifications. Vladimir Merta and Vladimir Misik are two very talented rock musicians. They have a great many loyal fans, who guarantee that their records and concerts are sold out. They have never engaged in any kind of oppositionist politics, and yet they have found it increasingly difficult in the past 5 years to give concerts or make records. There is general agreement that they have been denied these opportunities simply because their music is too inventive and interesting. The repressive controls exercised over the production and spread of rock music in the late seventies gave young people little reason to rejoice.

Toward the end of the seventies a movement emerged in Prague which was able to express a protest about the rock desert which was being cultivated so lovingly by the bureaucracy. A number of rather bizarre avant-garde groups organized semiofficial concerts which soon drew the attention of disillusioned Prague youth. These bands, with names such as Electrobus, Extempore, Stehlik (Goldfinch) and Zaba (Frog), had no use for most conventional patterns of rhythm or melody. Their music was a collection of disconnected and disparate sounds taken from a broad scale of rock and folk cultures. Sometimes the concerts were interrupted by long silence (in one case for half an hour). It was therefore hardly the most popular kind of music in the history of Czechoslovak rock, but both form and content of the sound were a concrete expression of the frustrations being felt by the musicians and the public in light of the acute musical and social repression. Though it did not take long for the police to develop an

active interest in this phenomenon, the anarchist features and limited popularity were also responsible for the demise of this influential but short-lived movement. These artists constituted an important link between such groups as the Plastics and DG 307 as well as the Punks of the early eighties. The interest they aroused also shows that there existed an enormous potential for an alternative rock scene.

This indicates how successful the regime was in guarding young Czechoslovaks from Western influence and that punk rock did not seriously influence music in the CSSR until 1981--5 years after it had, for instance, revived rock in Great Britain. Despite the delay, Czech* punk had a similarly refreshing effect on a culture which was among the most stagnant in Europe. Although the dress and music had obviously been borrowed from the Western movement, it did not take long for domestic punk groups to lend the movement specifically Czech features. By mid-1982 in Prague, concerts by such bands as Jasna Paka (Patent), Letadlo (Airplane) and above all Prazsky Vyber (Prague Selection) had become important cultural events for many young Czechs. They experienced a similar kind of grinding enthusiasm as characterized the British punks. No more distant narcissistic stars who appeared on a stage many meters away from the audience! They were replaced by young working-class Czechs whose musical polish perhaps left something to be desired but whose enthusiasm and energy were a more than adequate substitute. Lyrics about love and a radiant socialist future were replaced by songs about sexual problems and the miserable life in Prague apartment houses. Performers and audience very strongly identified with one another, but they were forced to acknowledge many social restrictions which Western punks had never had to contend with. If one shows up with a Mohican haircut or a safety pin in one's nose, it is more difficult to escape the attention of the police in Prague than in London, Berlin, Vienna, New York or Paris.

Despite the social and political ostracism to which the Czech punks were exposed, both the number and the popularity of the bands increased. What is perhaps more surprising is that the number of student clubs ready to organize punk concerts increased as well. Every concert needed the blessing of someone who worked in the party or was an SSM (Union of Socialist Youth) official. It can only be assumed that by 1982 these people, who represented the watchdogs of culture, had become careless or that they were no longer able to recognize how dangerous it was when young people could have fun expressing their experience the way they liked.

There was good reason why the party was less accommodating in its attitude. Both in form and content, punk expresses the frustrations of an alienated urban youth. The popularity of Czech punk meant that questions such as vandalism, boredom and rejection of consumer-oriented--or even bourgeois--attitudes and values were discussed more frequently and openly than was to the party's liking. The philosophy accompanying punk proved increasingly more attractive to young Czechs than the unpopular subservience offered by the regime. Early this year the party decided to take action.

*There is no information available about punk in Slovakia

In March the cultural weekly of the party, TRIBUNA, published a long article by Jan Kryzl about rock music and the Czech "New Wave." The contents and some of the language used by Kryzl are remarkable. After publication, the new punk culture in Czechoslovakia was destroyed.

Kryzl begins his article with a brief history of rock music and its social significance in the West. This part is riddled with inaccuracies and simplifications, but only when he starts preaching about punk in the West does the real defamation occur:

"Rock music became a big business and a tool for spreading ideological and cultural deviations aimed not only at youth in the West but also at young people in the socialist countries. The people controlling and organizing this business were fully aware of the fact that the economic crisis of the seventies and the growing discontent of youth in light of the growing social pressures within the capitalist system would doubtless inspire new and old battle songs.

"At that very moment the New Wave appeared on the rock scene. It was meant to impart to the 'damned' generation of the capitalist world a philosophy expressed by the slogan 'No Future!' Thus youth was to identify with the kind of life the capitalists had provided for it. Don't bother about anything going on around you! Don't join anyone against anything! Nothing is of any use! That became the credo of the young generation. To encourage this, they were served punk rock, heavy metal and trash (sic-A.C.) Rock....

"Primitive lyrics and primitive music, disgusting clothes, provocative behavior, obscene gestures.... This was hardly pleasant aesthetically, shocking even the citizens of the capitalist world, but it was better than having young people who were fighting against the system."

The opinion that punk was created by capitalist ideologues in order to disperse social unrest emanating from the economic crisis is self-evidently wrong. Punk was a movement at the base which customarily was explicitly associated with leftist contents and leftist politics. In contrast with previous rock protest movements, Punk dared to interfere in the economic infrastructure of the rock business. By establishing nonprofit-oriented independent recording and distribution companies, it even harmed the interests of the capitalists whom Kryzl makes responsible for the whole thing. To claim that groups such as The Clash, X-Ray Specs and the Tom Robinson Band were merely tools in the hands of capital in order to instill a philosophy of "pessimism" and "nihilism" into young people is gross slander. Kryzl apparently considers it irrelevant that punk and reggae were the driving forces behind "Rock Against Racism" and "Rock Against Sexism." But Kryzl was not really interested in any details of Western punk. These distortions were only a springboard for facilitating his attacks against the Czech new wave music. Before launching these attacks, he first explained how punk and new wave reached the CSSR.

"It is no coincidence that punk and the new wave were spread in our republic by Western radio transmitters and other means.... The intention thus

pursued by foreign intelligence services is twofold: 1) to make our young people familiar with this musical junk, and 2) by pretending that this is simply part of a new "wave" engulfing the entire world, to establish groups here. These groups are to produce music contradicting all our aesthetic and moral norms."

Having described the role of the CIA, MI5 and BND [FRG Federal Intelligence Service] in this matter (though I must admit that I have never heard any kind of punk music on the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe or the Czech service of the BBC), Kryzl attacks all the officials responsible for organizing and promoting punk concerts. He mentions three particular scenes in Prague--no doubt causing the poor bureaucrats working there to break out in cold sweat while reading the article. This part of the attack was to have far-reaching consequences, as we shall see shortly.

Concluding his article, Kryzl inveighs against the vulgarity of punk lyrics, calling it "equivocal." To document this, he quotes from Jasna Paka-- "Bejby, bejby, dej mi Cadillac" (baby, baby, give me a Cadillac)-- and Letadlo--"Hippy, hippy sejk" (hippy, hippy, shake). These phrases mean as much or as little in Czech as they do in German. Kryzl is most indignant about the Bronz group, quoting: "Nas pan je kral, ma jmeno heroin" (our master is king; its name is heroin). This might be fairly valid--if it were not for the fact that Bronz is not a punk band and that the line is from a serious rock opera which was performed in Prague with full official support because it was regarded as a serious work with a social message.

After describing punk songs as the product of a "crazy mind"--an "obscene" mind displaying a "basic lack of culture"--Kryzl concludes by calling the music "garbage" and "trash," leaving the reader with the impression that he has read the writing of a paranoid. Unfortunately paranoids writing long articles in TRIBUNA exercise considerable influence, and since the article appeared almost all important Punk groups have been prohibited from engaging in any kind of activity whatever. Those inexperienced or fairly lax apparathiks received serious warnings, and their prospects of climbing the slippery steps of the career ladder toward the party hierarchy suffered a setback. The Punks were included in the growing ranks of "public enemies No 1" in the CSSR.

In contrast with similar occasions, the Punks did not, however, have to rely exclusively on well-meaning Charter 77 members (who do not always have their fingers on the pulse of the times) coming to their defense. Two sections of the official Musicians Union (the Jazz and Youth Section)--in their own way--in the past few years have been able to retain a lively independent way of expression by shrieking from amid the machinery of the establishment. This May the Jazz Section produced an answer to Kryzl's TRIBUNA article. This remarkable piece, "Rock on the Leftwing," is simply the most daring and open text to have been published officially [in italics] in years. To be sure, its spread was limited to members of the Jazz Section, but it takes full aim at the attitudes of the press in the CSSR. It is

a long essay dealing in detail with Kryzl's lies and inaccuracies. In the final portion, the criticism is expanded:

"It is no secret that violence and social disruption have increased in our society for many years. In the seventies we experienced a wave of unprecedented vandalism. It was tied to a broad scale of cultural and particularly sports activities. Such events invariably fulfill the same function, be it during a soccer game or at a rock concert: individuals of a destructive sort gather in groups, which lends them a greater sense of strength. This is the way it has been for 20 years, whether Sparta wins or loses, or whether it is a rock 'n' roll concert, hard rock or punk.

"These trends being more numerous than ever, we can hardly trace them back just to rock concerts.... Instead we have to ask: Who has been responsible for work with youth in the past few years, particularly with youth in under-qualified or poorly qualified work? Who prepared them for such a life? Whoever it was, we are now reaping the harvest they sowed--destroyed tombstones, ruined telephone receivers and people mugged at night.

"If one shifts the responsibility from those who neglected their work with youth (and of course this also involves an entire ministerial apparatus) to some few rock groups whose aesthetic ideas you don't begin to understand, this understandably leads to further escapism in pop music. The punks suffer the same fate as Merta, Misik and Catapult.... It is a shame that on this occasion the music that is attacked is one in which the trends toward social and political obligation predominate--a rock music which is firmly leftwing.

"All right, there will no longer be any dangerous types emerging at new wave concerts. Instead they will meet elsewhere, and destroyed telephone booths will not be a matter of the past.... This will not only interrupt the continuity of musical development but, above all, will engender hatred against those who have robbed youth of its music. It will engender distrust of the party's cultural policy and contribute to a distortion of the moral profile of our society. Since you chose TRIBUNA as a platform for venting your spleen, the public will associate your ideas with those of communist party ideology.

"And now we come to the last point of our polemic. Who will benefit from all this? Who will probably profit most from your articles, Comrades Kryzl and Bakesova?*

"Every young citizen has had a number of opportunities to leave this country in the past few years. Those who were unable to live here because of their weltanschauung or their need for a more varied selection of cheese or records have left. All right. Those who have remained (and there are tens of thousands of us) did so because they are concerned about the fate of this country. Are we to spend the remaining 40 or 50 years of our lives in institutionalized fear of another Jan Kryzl coming up tomorrow, or the

*A short article by Mrs Bakesova in RUDE PRAVO presented a summary of Kryzl's article

day after, with ridiculous and uninformed articles with which he exploits the reputation of one of the party's main ideological organs in order to liquidate the work of many people and many years? Can we afford such a luxury in a country with 15 million people? And are we funks going to accept this damage to the interests of our culture much longer, or are we going to say at length that enough is enough?

"We know what influence pop music exercises on young people. But the young fan is not interested only in songs. He or she is also interested every bit as much in what is being written and said on the musical scene. How is he or she to reconcile to the fact that the most momentous journals in Czechoslovakia print such a collection of patent lies as have been found in your articles?

"Your claim, which you have such trouble corroborating, that foreign intelligence services bear the responsibility--don't fool yourself: it was your responsibility. With your articles in TRIBUNA and RUDE PRAVO you have nurtured hate and distrust among thousands of young people. At the same time this distrust is directed not only against you but against the media which print your untruths and also against the CPCZ, whose reputation was damaged severely by your publishing your pieces in its main journals.

"You have destroyed part of party work extending over many years. And for this reason, Comrades Bakesova and Kryzl, we charge you with having damaged the interests of the party in one of the most delicate fields of its work--among the young people.

"Whom does this benefit?

"You can answer that question yourselves.

"Josef Vlcek.

"Prague 11, 18 April 1983."

This article was not by any means the only expression of protest as a result of the Kryzl and Bakesova articles, but it certainly was the most careful, bold and articulate. The fact that the Jazz Section decided to print it shows how widespread the repugnance against the treatment of the punks is, for the article was followed by many letters which reached the office of the Jazz Section after publication of the Kryzl article.

After this caustic counterblow against the Kryzl article and the decision to ban punk music, young people in the CSSR wondered what kind of policy the cultural bureaucracy would develop toward rock culture. When the answer came, it was brutal.

A rock festival had been planned to take place 11 June in the village of Zabcice, a few kilometers from the Moravian capital, Brno. More than 1,000 young Czechoslovaks congregated there from all corners of the country on the morning of that day only to be told curtly by the local police that the concert had been canceled and that they all should go home. The majority

had to go via Brno, and many had to wait for train or bus connections. About 400 or 500 people spent the afternoon in a park near a restaurant bearing the uncannily ironic name of "Na strelnici" (The Target Range). The atmosphere was relaxed and pleasant. The people played soccer, sang songs or just got together and chatted. There was some beer, but no incidents of drunkenness were reported. None of the local people or of the restaurant personnel had any kind of complaint about the young people's behavior.

Toward 6 o'clock there appeared five policemen, who began to check identity cards and then ordered everyone to leave the park. One person who asked for the reason was immediately arrested. Excited, the young people started to sing "We want peace, we want freedom." Thereupon some police reinforcements, which had been on the alert, arrived in patrol wagons and buses. With truncheons, dogs without muzzles and teargas, they began to disperse the crowd. Several among the unprotected and peaceful crowd were injured by dogbites and truncheons. There was chaos, people were dragged away by their hair though they had not done anything provocative. Those who were taken away and put under police custody were kept away from their friends and personal belongings and deprived of all legal rights. Finally 26 people, all between the age of 18 and 22, were charged with one of the following: Unlawful assembly, preventing a police officer from carrying out his duty, doing physical or verbal injury to a police officer. They all were kept under detention for almost 3 months, and one of them was transferred to a psychiatric penal clinic. On 28 September the sentences were pronounced. Stanislav Benes and Jiri Zboril were sentenced to 10 and 6 months, respectively, in a prison of the first penal category. Petr Geffert and Jiri Panacek were sentenced to 20 and 9 months, respectively, in prisons of the second category. The evidence offered by the police consistently failed to jibe, and if a normal legal standard had been applied it could never have been claimed that the case against these people had been proved. They were in fact condemned because they were exercising their right to be at a public place on an early summer evening.

This event was received with horror nationwide. A number of detailed samizdat publications were produced. The authors are people who quite clearly had never participated in any kind of opposition in the CSSR.

The event in Brno is but one of several affecting young people this year. There was a spontaneous demonstration in Prague on the occasion of the World Peace Congress consisting mainly of young working-class Czechs. There are unconfirmed reports that a demonstration of 400 or 500 people took place in Pisek on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet invasion. These are the first spontaneous demonstrations to take place in the CSSR since 1969, and it looks as if young people constitute the majority of participants.

It has long been evident that the cultural bureaucracy neither understands rock music nor realizes the important role it plays in the life of young Czechoslovaks. Events this year have shown that the regime continues to steer toward a course of collision with its citizens.

(The author of this article thanks Palach Press, London, for its long and thorough Charter 77 document about the most recent history of rock and pop music in the CSSR.)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

ARCHITECTURAL RENOVATION MIRRORS RENEWED INTEREST IN HISTORY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Dec 83 Sunday Supplement pp 25, 28

[Article by Lars Fimmerstad: "Frederik the Great Has Made a Comeback: German History in Fashion in the East"]

[Text] A swarm of construction workers laying foundations by hand, and construction cranes which stand out against the sky surround Berlin's oldest church, the Nicholai Church. Here on the muddy banks of the River Spree stood Berlin for 570 years. Here the old Berlin was destroyed during World War II. And here the foundation is now being laid for an entirely new "old town" with winding cobblestone alleys, mansions, picturesque houses, small taverns and gas lights. The double towers of the church, which seem to defy the ravages of time, were actually lifted into place by a helicopter last fall.

In May 1945 the Russians fought through to Hitler's bunker in the heart of Berlin. Then 70 percent of the city lay in ruins. The oldest part of Berlin was wiped from the face of the earth.

Now almost 40 years after the end of the war the East Berliners will get back their history in newly constructed form.

The GDR has restored the past. Gone are the banners and slogans, no more utopian, boastful buildings such as those which during the last decade grew against the skyline around the city's new center between Marx-Engels Platz and Alexander Platz around the futuristic TV tower with its rotating restaurant.

Now Romanticism Blooms

Now instead romanticism is blooming in the worker and farmer state. In all cities of the republic historical environments have been lovingly restored. And the capital city has priority.

Berlin's historical center landed in the East when the allies divided up the city after the war--it will be restored before the end of the 1980's. The Prussian capital, which was formerly called "Spree-Athen" because of its scholarship and its classical buildings, is regaining some of its lost splendor after decades of decay and gaping empty ruins.

The slogan is "a representative capital." A contest in city building, officially denied, is going on just now on both sides of the wall--the city will be 750 in 1987. West Berlin is building a model city section not far from Checkpoint Charlie. In the East a city center is being built at the same time.

It is a large project being started in East Berlin for billions of marks--none of the administrators I met during several days in East Berlin's tapes-tried corridors, guarded by Erich Honecker's admonitory gaze from framed color photographs on the walls behind the desks seemed to know how many. I was accompanied from morning to evening by a "technical advisor" after I first said "no thanks" to an interpreter.

The new "old town" which I told about at the beginning of this article will not be just a copy of the part of the city which was there in the middle of the last century, it is being reproduced in the smallest details: Old shop signs and sundials are being made according to photographs. Where there was a tavern, there will also be a tavern, where there is a pharmacy in an old yellowed photograph, there will also be a pharmacy.

More Historical Than It Was

The district will be more historical than it has ever been. An old inn which now only exists in very old Berliners' nostalgic memories, Am Nussbaum, which was on the adjacent Fischerinsel is being built on a street corner. A middle-ages magistrates court which was decorated in new gothic style one hundred years ago and was destroyed during the war and lay several hundred meters away will be restored to its original appearance in the historic quarter.

The burned-out and destroyed Efraim Palace from the 1700's is being built beside its original location, according to original sketches and with the decorative details which were taken to storage and kept in the West at the end of the war, and are now being returned.

Not far from Nicholaiviertel, as the new "old town" is called, rises Berlin's protestant dome, a magnificent William-style building in new baroque, which is being renovated just now with money from the West German Evangelical Church.

From there the Unter den Linden passes by a cluster of representative palaces from the Prussian and German Empire times, reflecting some of the

horrifying aura which once must have surrounded them. They were restored early in the days of the republic.

In this neighborhood there are now statues and monuments being erected from Germany's past. Memorials which lay preserved in storage in the West are being taken out and venerated again in the capital of socialism.

One of Europe's Prettiest Places

The most prestigious project is, however, the rebuilding of the former Gendarmenmarkt, now called Platz der Akademie. In the middle of the old inner city the place stood in ruins with its classic Schauspielhaus from 1821, designed by the greatest Prussian architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel. On both sides of the square sat the remains of the two baroque churches, Franzosischer and Deutscher Dom for decade after decade, burned out and without roofs. In its day the square was considered one of the prettiest in Europe. Tourists who came via Checkpoint Charlie along the still-not-restored Friedrichstrasse saw these ruins dominating this sorrowfully ravaged cityscape.

Today there are building sites where the old monumental buildings are rising. Schinkel's theater is being rededicated next year, but as a concert hall, and both of the churches will be like new before the end of this decade.

Around the square the construction cranes are lifting concrete units with classical windows into place. Houses are being built in the old style, with arcades and pilasters.

GDR No Longer Lacking in History

Everything seems to be constructed as quaintly as possible. In a completed building I glimpsed a shining new cafe in youthful style with mirrors, palms, chairs and the name in spiral calligraphy.

Public buildings in East Berlin were always built until recently looking like international airports. Now the old fashioned comfortable appearance which we also cultivate has come to the GDR, previously so lacking in history.

The intimate scale and the historically adapted architecture also marks the award winning design for how the gaping, bombed-out lots in the mangled inner city should be rebuilt. It should all be completed before 1990. Friedrichstrasse, once the liveliest avenue in this part of the city, will regain some of its former sparkle.

A new variety palace is already arising on the avenue not far from the Brecht Theater. Gone is the box architecture of the 70's. They have gone in for something which we in the West would call postmodernism. Or perhaps

a reawakened youth style. The facade has projecting ornaments, all ordered from a factory, and above the building facing there are almost moorish windows inlaid with colored glass.

Why is it time for East Berlin finally to heal the last sores in the city picture?

The explanation is partly economic. Under three 5-year plans extending to 1990, 200 billion marks (600 billion kronor according to the official rate) is being invested to solve the housing problem. It is the largest economic investment in the history of the young republic. "The housing question has absolute priority, everything else comes later," is the continuously repeated sentence among the city planners in East Berlin.

Entire City Center Will Be Inhabited

An entirely new city for 220,000 people--Marzahn--is being built outside East Berlin, 100,000 people have already moved in, and the great gloomy housing areas, for example Prenzlauer Berg, with its gray rented barracks from the last century will be renovated to somewhat modern standards. Even today almost half of the dwellings in Berlin have been spruced up and are heated by coal stoves.

The restoration of the inner city will cost billions. One strength of city planning in the East is that it does not depend on land speculation, and the accompanying fancy prices for lots in the city center. Here practically everything is built according to the formula--one floor for businesses, one floor for offices, and the rest for residence.

The result is that the entire inner city is inhabited, there is no office desert which is abandoned in the evening. Even in the new "old town" and around Platz der Akademie there will be residences. The reconstruction of the inner city is also a part of the housing program which must be completed before 1990. Elite construction-knowledgeable units from the youth organization Frie Deutsche Jugend are brought into the capital from other parts of the country for 2 years to expedite the reconstruction. Like the Caliph Harun ar-Rachid in the "Thousand and One Nights," the GDR leader Erich Honecker himself goes around the streets and looks impatiently at how the construction is going, according to his respectful subordinates.

German History Back in Style

Another reason why the time is ripe for historic Berlin to rise from its ruins is the renewed interest in Germany's past.

The burned-out ruin of Berlin's old city hall, a very baroque building, was blown up in 1951, although it was less damaged than the soon-rebuilt Schloss Charlottenburg in West Berlin.

"The hall was so strongly associated with Frederick the Great, who was constantly misused by nazi propaganda," said Horst Weiss, who was and is the inspector for cultural monuments in East Berlin.

The blowing up of the hall was a symbolic event which later was deplored by Honecker.

Today Inspector Weiss does not need to blow up any buildings. Instead he sat for several hours showing me old photographs which serve as models for designs of the old houses which the masons are constructing around Nicholai Church. Frederick the Great has been returned to favor, his statue is back on its old place on Unter den Linden, and his clothes are piously on display in the Historical Museum in the former artillery depot from the 1600's.

In the museum Marlis Hujer, who has just arranged the Prussian section according to today's ideological fashion, speaks with pride about the Prussian virtues of industriousness and order. Today's republic prefers to see itself as the inheritors of the Prussian state, with its disciplined population and army.

The Prussian Army is presented as a "People's Army" during the war of liberation against Napoleon, and the museum is full of revered displays devoted to its generals. These old warriors are presented as heroes and their names are on the highest decorations in today's cherished "People's Army."

A Symbolic Transformation of the City

There is no great fantasy required to imagine how future Berliners will prefer to abandon the sterile, boastful buildings around Marx-Engels Platz and move their promenades to their reawakened Prussian city center in a few years.

In the same way they abandoned the socialist grandeur of the street which began to be constructed in the beginning of the 50's, with the name Stalin Allee at the eastern edge of the center. Now it is called Karl Marx Allee. The walls are flaking off the grand Stalinist buildings today, and nobody talks about that part of the city.

From Stalin Allee via Marx-Engels Platz to Platz der Akademie, is there any deeper symbolism in that transformation of the city?

9287

CSO: 3650/97

REVIVAL OF PRUSSIAN ETHIC, POLICY NOTED

Bismarck Selectively Viewed

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Dec 83 p 4

/Article by "Ws." datelined Berlin, 16 Dec: "The 'Educators' Cadre' of the GDR Is Permitted to Cite Bismarck"7

/Text7 Kurt Hager, SED Politburo member and CC secretary responsible for culture and science, appealed at the SED's conference on sociology for strengthening the defense ethic in the GDR. Hager talked of some dislike of military service among GDR youth when he said: "Similar to every other fundamental socialist attitude, defense readiness does not evolve spontaneously."

In the course of his address to more than 800 scholars, party and state functionaries, leading economists, representatives of the armed forces and the block parties, Hager returned to mention of the "socialist German nation" in the GDR--though Honecker, for example, has almost abandoned use of this term. In the dispute with our foes, Hager said, the role of "socialist historic consciousness" increased. Knowledge of the wherefrom and whereto, of "our approach" was an indispensable source of strength for the further organization of the developed socialist society. "We interpret the history of the GDR in the meaning, too, of the national history of the German people." This embodies the most profound and irreversible change in the history of the German people and, consequently, adds to the history of the Germans its most important, successful and promising chapter.

In this context Hager dismissed the speculations that, in the West, accompany the GDR's rediscovery of German history. "While we consider the historical traditions of our workers and farmers state, we assume an unambiguous attitude toward all reactionary forces and ambitions in German history," said the SED's ideological pope. This, he continued, clearly demonstrated that the speculations of some FRG people were built on sand, who hoped that the GDR preoccupation with the basic issues, events and personalities of German history might yield something like a transcending community of interests between the GDR and FRG. After all, Hager reflected, it was very hard to deny that entirely incompatible, indeed contradictory political and scholarly assumptions, value and target conceptions governed the GDR and FRG approaches to any historical issues; they actually reflected the historical reality of a socialist state on the one hand and an imperialist state on the other.

Hager who has been holding his present office since 1955, went on to say that history offered examples of representatives of exploiting classes, who were able to keep a grip on reality or achieved such grip painfully, by thorny bypaths, without bursting their class-related perceptual horizons. They were represented in German history by people like Yorck von Wartenburg, Bismarck, Rathenau, Stauffenberg and the people involved in the 20 July 1944 conspiracy, who all acted in very different historical circumstances and from very different class interests and motives. Bismarck certainly did not deserve praise from GDR historians in his capacity as the initiator of the law against socialists, the man responsible for the conflict with the Catholic Church and the German empire's policy of Germanization. "On the other hand, the U.S. confrontation politicians' policy, threatening and future of mankind and unconditionally backed by leading circles in the FRG, requires us to remember other aspects of his politics and personality." Bismarck formulated the political principle--we must work with realities rather than with fictions. His sense of realism--albeit certainly orientated pragmatically to class interests--enabled him soberly to calculate with respect to important issues, especially foreign affairs, to plead for good relations with Russia. In February 1888 he emphatically opposed a preventive war "due to the compelling interests of the balance of power in Europe and our own future"--to cite his own words. Hager's summing up: "Nobody should be surprised when we recall such attitudes (though derived from entirely different class interests) at a time when much depends on the answer to the question whether a sense of realism and commonsense will prove stronger than adventurism and military megalomania within the ruling circles of the imperialist states." That is why, he continued, it was timely to recall such attitudes of Bismarck--within the limits he had clearly outlined.

Ideas, Practices Prussianized

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Dec 83 p 1

/Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme, responsible editor for internal politics: "Old-German/Prussian as a Facade"/

/Text/ Anyone glancing at "real life" in the GDR might easily arrive at the conclusion that more of "old Germany" is preserved there than in the FRG. Older people sentimentally recognize images of their youth, younger ones are surprised to discover that all of Germany must once have looked like that. Of course, closer scrutiny shows up the changes, even in the flat countryside: Farm houses are decrepit, giant fields bear witness to the state as the major new landowner.

For some time past the communist authorities have resumed the practice of old traditions. Gone are the days when the structural remains of old times were demolished or left to decay. Much money and skill is expended on "reconstruction"--a term used over there to avoid the word "restoration" and its wicked connotations. King Frederick II of Prussia had his monument restored to Unter den Linden. Luther was celebrated with emphasis on his "all-German-ness," murmurs of approval are even audible regarding Bismarck. Are we to take it, then, that affairs in the GDR are miraculously going to be returned to their former state?

The changes in the GDR are thoroughgoing and immense; the behavior of the people has by no means been so static as the prewar plaster on the buildings. More than just leveling has occurred. The attitude to work has changed--and here we may indeed spot the beginnings of conformity with the West: Idealistic impulses are considered old-fashioned, hours are meticulously counted, people attempt to do as little as possible for as much as possible, supplementary wages are called "premiums," and they in turn are supplemented by the wages for "black work", which is called after-hours work.

The GDR is just as helpless and uncertain as the Federal Republic when confronted with such phenomena. Without after-hours work many of the old buildings would no longer be habitable; at the same time the privileged section of the public--able to offer "black work"--would be more dissatisfied without it. Consequently, black work is in the interest of a regime mindful of the supremacy of stability. If Honecker were really as admirable as some former permanent representatives assert, he ought to be in despair about the slipping away to private life of the people whom he had wanted to lead to strict, comparable to Prussianism, socialism.

Will the GDR with a new relatively unimportant ideological veneer be a successor to Prussia? This view is a symptom of nostalgia that the West allows itself. The workman, for example, who has no time at all to spare but does arrive promptly once Western money is promised--is that supposed to be Prussian? The state store where scarce merchandise is kept under the counter for those who can offer a bribe, the nurse who threatens to leave at the end of her shift, regardless whether her relief has arrived on time--is that Prussianism, is it in tune with acceptance of duty, discipline, parsimony and renunciation? The residents of the GDR cannot easily accept the regime's attempt to demonstrate Prussian, German national character. Older people consider it communist usurpation, younger people probably one of the many caprices their rulers enjoy and that they must cope with somehow--by inner evasion and adaptation. The free residents of the GDR would behave no differently if they shared the experiences of GDR residents. Including the 12 years of National Socialism, the present GDR has lacked freedom for some 50 years. That leaves its mark; those who were mared differently have become old. Some people think that the emphasis on Prussianism, on tradition generally, is a sign of weakness of the GDR regime. To be sure, youths display some adaptation to Western lifestyles, but that phenomenon stays on the surface: Deep down (and this is not meant as a reproach), they try to make the best of their own lives in the prevailing circumstances, with a measure of adjustment corresponding to their own willingness to resign themselves to the situation. For example, even people critical of the regime, who tentatively and often fearfully orient themselves to the West (it is remarkable that the GDR is obviously willing to permit easy access to Western television), consider the "youth consecration" of their 14-year old children a noteworthy event. It has been forgotten that the Nazis, too, introduced a "youth consecration"; at the time this was derided as a vain attempt to replace confirmation. True, the Nazi system lasted for only 12 years.

Though sacrifice is involved, some older, and especially, young people find comfort in religion, that comfort needed by almost all who wish to pursue their own way, independent of social standards, let alone standards elevated to a state doctrine, as is the case in the GDR. This is the approach chosen by those who have retained

and nurtured middle class values--not to be equated with money snobbery or primitive nationalism. The regime is firmly in the saddle; it simply gets rid of those whom it finds irritating--that, incidentally, is the more convenient solution for the rulers. A definite lifestyle has evolved in the GDR. It may not entirely conform to the one that issued from the regime's drawing board. At the same time it is different from the one in the West, and certainly not the traditional facade of a long gone Prussian Germany. The reminder of the latter is simply an aspect of East Berlin's preventive strategy for the future, not a reflection of embarrassment, let alone fear. Honecker might be said to have been successful if "the West" were to misunderstand the phenomenon.

11698

CSO: 2300/229

HUNGARY

VARIOUS WAYS OF ATTAINING, RENOUNCING CITIZENSHIP EXPLAINED

Budapest MAGYAR HIREK in Hungarian 26 Nov 83 p 6

[Article by Dr Karoly Besnyo, member of the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic: "Citizenship and the Child;" portions within slantlines are in italics]

[Text] By virtue of its birth a child becomes a citizen, but what kind of citizenship it obtains is dependent on statutory regulations.

According to the Hungarian citizenship law the "most common way" to obtain Hungarian citizenship is birth. The law's first paragraph provides that "a Hungarian citizen is one who is the child of parents who are Hungarian citizens."

This basic principle is called the doctrine of /jus sanguinis/, which means that any child who has one parent who is a Hungarian citizen acquires Hungarian citizenship irrespective of its place of birth.

If the child is born abroad, and one parent is a Hungarian citizen and the other a foreigner, the child acquires Hungarian citizenship from the Hungarian parent.

If the child lives abroad and acquires citizenship from its foreign parent, then the choice of release from the ties of Hungarian citizenship comes into effect. In such a case the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic--upon petition--terminates the child's Hungarian citizenship--if this does not harm the interests of the state. A child who is a minor--under 18 years of age--can request this procedure through a legal representative.

The regulations concerning Hungarian citizenship--in agreement with the laws of other European states--recognize /jus soli/ only as an auxiliary principle. But if we were to deny its validity, the children of stateless parents would also become stateless! On the basis of /jus soli/ and by virtue of its birth on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic any child acquires Hungarian citizenship whose parents are stateless and who thus would not obtain either Hungarian or foreign citizenship as the offspring of such parents. Citizenship acquired in this way remains valid until such time as any foreign citizenship is verified.

A minor's naturalization, or rather renaturalization, is very closely linked to the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship on the basis of lineage. If the foreign-citizen parent requests naturalization, or rather renaturalization, the naturalization or renaturalization extends to the minor child as well. An exception occurs if the father or mother exercising parental supervision expressly requests that the naturalization or renaturalization not extend to his or her child.

Moreover, the child of a non-Hungarian parent becomes a Hungarian citizen if the other parent, who is a Hungarian national becomes the child's father by a declaration of assumption of paternal responsibility, or by establishing his paternity in the courts, or if he subsequently marries the child's mother.

Also worthy of mention is the case in which a parent residing abroad seriously betrays his or her allegiance to the Hungarian state, or is legally convicted of a grave crime by a Hungarian or foreign court. In such a case the Presidium can strip the parent of his or her Hungarian citizenship. Should it so happen, however, the denaturalization does not automatically extend to the spouse or the child.

12327

CSO: 2500/143

HUNGARY

DATA ON HUNGARIAN WORKERS ABROAD, ALIEN WORKERS IN HUNGARY GIVEN

Alien Workers in Hungary

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian Nos 52-53, 24 Dec 83 pp 9-10

[Article: "Aliens in Hungary"]

[Text] At present in Hungary there are about 7,000 Poles, 1,400 Cubans, and several hundred Czechoslovak, East German, and Austrian guest specialists working in an organized way in the framework of inter-enterprise cooperation. In addition there are about 2,000 individual aliens working here, and several hundred "commuting" workers registered who live on the other side of the Hungarian-CSSR border and work regularly in Hungary in the framework of manpower cooperation between the two countries.

The Poles are the largest in number among those working here. Garbor Miklos inquired in Warsaw about their mission and pay. We publish his report below.

Polservice, through whose organization and mediation Polish manpower comes to Hungary, is the largest Polish enterprise specialized for the export of skilled personnel. It entered on the Hungarian market 5 years ago, as recalled by my discussion partner, Boleslaw Wiltib, group leader in the Warsaw center of the firm. Since then its income from Hungary has been continuously rising: from 35 million rubles in the first year the payment for Polish services has risen this year to more than 80 million rubles. Of this more than three-fourths are transferred directly to Polservice, and the rest is shared among several firms specializing in the construction industry. The 80 million rubles is only the price for the expertise and manpower extended by the Poles, and this differs from the earlier undertakings--such as the delivery of the complete Kaba Sugar Factory--where the export of Polish materials and equipment was also called for in the contract.

Polservice has about 7,000 workers at present at Hungarian enterprises in the most varied lines of work. They include welders, lathe operators, locksmiths, meat experts--who among other places work at the Papa Meat Combine canned ham factory--printing experts, and textile workers. Many of them are construction industry specialists who work on the restoration of the Budapest Opera, the Economics University, the Traumatology Institute, and in the Paks nuclear power plant. A large Polish group is also working at the Ganz-Mavag, and the Raba Hungarian Railroad Car and Machine Factory.

PolSERVICE and its associated enterprises are not in touch with the individual Polish workers but with their enterprises. The recruiting committees examine the expertise of the applicant and his previous work experience. In general at least 2 years of work at one place is required. There are many applicants, and the recruiters have no problems in selectivity. Above all, earnings are the lure. My discussion partner said that the forint payment of Poles working in Hungary considerably exceeds the Hungarian average wage. In Poland--parallel with this--they receive on the average 3,500 zlotys. They are also lured by the fact that half of the forints earned in Hungary may be used in vouchers valid at home in the business network that sells for convertible foreign exchange. Otherwise my discussion partner cautioned me against using the expression "guest worker." "The Poles working in Hungary are workers of the enterprises that sends them--they have service passports--and this term cannot be used for them," concludes the report from Warsaw.

In response to a question from HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, MHD [Hungarian Ship and Crane Factory] stated that they have a contractual relationship with the employers of the Polish workers who are at their enterprise, and the countervalue of the work is paid to these Polish organizations. That is, the Poles working for MHD receive their wages from the Polish employers. For the MHD the cost of employing the Poles comes to about 250 forints per hour, including the cost of meals and free lodgings. (But the workers themselves receive only a part of this sum, partly in forints and partly in zlotys.) For the sake of comparison: MHD's hourly wage costs for a Hungarian worker--taking into account wages and allowances--are about 60 to 70 forints. If they hire fitters or welders from a tsz [agricultural producer cooperative] the hourly wage costs are around 150 forints.

The Hungarian Ministry of Finance added the following comments on all this: the Hungarian economy needs foreign, including Polish, working hands. Today almost every large industry plant employs them: not only Ganz-Mavag, Raba, the Papa Meat Combine, the MHD but also the Csepel Automobile Factory, the Danube Iron Works, the Csepel Iron and Metal Works, the No 43 Construction Industry Enterprise, and the Peti Nitrogen Works. They supply working hands where there is a shortage: they may be found doing heavy physical work, and jobs requiring special expertise and capability. They are industrious, hard-working--this is the general image. This evaluation is related to the fact that their earnings exceed by far the earnings of their Hungarian colleagues in similar jobs, a matter which causes considerable tensions.

At the Hungarian enterprises this impressive wage payment is accounted largely to import costs and not wages--they are required to pay to the Polish enterprises the CEMA-prescribed 5 to 7 transferable rubles per hour.

From the Hungarian point of view it would be a much better solution to establish joint enterprises between the host Hungarian and the guest Polish firms, which could then negotiate identical wages for identical achievement.

Hungarian Workers Abroad

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian Nos 52-53, 24 Dec 83 p 10

[Article: "Hungarians Abroad"]

[Text] Almost 6 months since the publication of the pertinent statutory provision, it is still a rarity to see Hungarians who are placed as individual employees in the West. But there are applicants: the International Division of the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development is besieged by inquirers who expect the ministry to negotiate for them a position abroad. But this is not possible: the individual job seekers must find their own place of work, although openings are rare because of the high rate of unemployment (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 21 May 1983). Employers in the FRG and several other Western countries want to fill vacancies first of all with indigenous workers, and only if there is demonstrably no possibility to do this will they approve work permits for Hungarians. Apparently this is the main reason for the answers which we received in response to our telephone inquiries from a number of national authorities entrusted with the granting of permits.

Ministry of Transportation: Four persons have received work permits since May, two to the United States, one a locksmith and the other a press photographer. The third one received a managerial position in an Italian shipping agency and the fourth will work at an international organization in France.

Ministry of Agriculture and Food: Twelve have received permits, most of them to Austria and the FRG but also to Denmark, Switzerland, Cyprus, Italy and Iran. Sport trainers and equestrians as well as scientists and engineers have gained positions.

Ministry of Health: Fourteen have received permits, and 12 are already abroad. Four were already in a foreign country, and have requested an extension under the altered conditions. In addition to physicians, permission has been granted by this ministry to an economist and a language teacher. Five went to the FRG, the others to Finland, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland and Kuwait.

Ministry of Industry: About 30 permits have been granted for work abroad, and a decision will soon be made on 25 others. Most of them have accepted work in Austria and the FRG. However, some went to Nigeria and Algeria. A computer expert is preparing to go to the Philippines.

Budapest Capital City Council: In recent months about 100 permits have been granted, including 50 for the restaurant industry to work at the Matyas Pince in Vienna. Among others, 10 pensioners, 5 artisans, 4 UN experts, and 2 free lancers have also received permission for the most part in technical jobs, but a translator-interpreter has obtained a position in Great Britain and a sociologist in the Netherlands. Among the host countries, first place is occupied by Austria and the FRG, but there were those who received positions in Lebanon, Finland and Greece.

Those who wish to make the attempt despite the difficulties could receive a great deal of useful information at the recent public conference on the subject organized by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and the Invention Club of the Scientific Society of Organization and Management. Many asked whether there exists at all in Hungary an organization which deals with facilitating employment abroad. State organs do not deal with employment for individual workers abroad, as was pointed out at the meeting by Ferenc Munkacsy, department head of the ABMH (State Wage and Labor Office). Nor can such activity be conducted by coops, business work partnerships or private individuals. But there is no objection to anyone holding discussions or corresponding with a possible employer, and perhaps advertising for a position in foreign newspapers.

If the applicant submits all the required documents--the exact list is contained in ABMH bulletin 8002/1983 (MUK 9), the control organs must give a reply within 30 days according to state administrative rules.

The orders do not prescribe a threshold below which the employee's pay cannot go. (The highest pay possible is in the interest of the state for 20 percent of the payment in currency must be transferred to the Hungarian National Bank by the employee in foreign exchange; of course the forint equivalent is available in Hungary to the employee.) The licensing organs are fully familiar with foreign wage levels and probably would not approve a contract between employer and employee for an excessively low salary--the ABMH department chief said at the above-mentioned meeting of the Chamber of Commerce.

Up to now those accepting work abroad traveled with a service passport, that is, with a so-called service window. This also refers to members of a business work partnership, on whose application for a passport the work-place opinion is written by a representative of the business work partnership, or some other member of the partnership. (Even if the entire membership of a business work partnership were to accept work abroad, they would still have to submit applications individually.)

The ABMH representative also pointed out that in most foreign countries it is also necessary to have an employment permit from the officials of the host country, and this should be taken care of well in advance of work performance. The ABMH representative emphasized that whoever accepts work abroad is required to pay monthly in foreign exchange his pension contribution on the social security contribution of business work partnership members and of artisans on the basis of their earnings in Hungary.

A spouse may accompany providing, of course, the spouse also has a valid passport.

In speaking of the employment abroad of Hungarians, we cannot leave unmentioned TESCO [Office of Technical and Scientific Cooperation], the Hungarian foreign trade enterprise specializing in intellectual export. This enterprise acts in an organized way as the agency in sending Hungarian specialists abroad, partly within the framework of international technical-scientific

cooperation projects and partly within the framework of business activity. On the basis of international agreements there are at present 900 Hungarian experts with higher education working in developing countries. Within the framework of TESCO business activity, the Hungarian enterprises offer "their superfluous capacity" to developed or developing countries. Within such an organization, there are at present 1,600 Hungarians working abroad, most of them as manual laborers.

6691

CSO: 2500/168

DECREE ON CHANGES IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS PUBLISHED

Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY in Hungarian No 55, 10 Dec 83 pp 959-960

[Decree No 18/1983 of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic on the establishment and unification of communities and on the organization of community councils and joint councils]

[Text] The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic decrees:

1. a) In Baranya megye the establishment of the inner populated area of Satorhely in Nagynyarad community into a community with the name of Satorhely;
- b) In Fejer megye the establishment of the inner populated area of Szarliget in Szar community into a community with the name of Szarliget;
2. The unification:
 - a) In Bekes megye
of Gerla community with Bekescsaba city under the name of Bekescsaba;
 - b) In Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen megye
of Abaujdevecser, Fugod, Gibart communities with Encs large community under the name of Encs;
of Abod, Balajt, Damak, Ladbesenyo communities with Edeleny large community under the name of Edeleny;
of Ond community with Szerencs large community under the name of Szerencs;
 - c) In Hajdu-Bihar megye
of Hajduhadhaz and Teglas large communities under the name of Hadhazteglas;
 - d) In Komarom megye
of Szak and Szend communities under the name of Szakszend;

e) In Nograd megye

of Bank community with Retsag large community under the name of Retsag;

of Hasznos, Matraszolos communities with Paszto large community under the name of Paszto;

of Homokterenye, Matranovak and Nadujfalu communities under the name of Matraterenye

f) In Somogy megye

of Otvoskonyi community with Nagyatad city under the name of Nagyatad;

g) In Szolnok megye

of Tiszaszolos community with Tiszafured large community under the name of Tiszafured;

h) In Tolna megye

of Parti community with Tamasi large community under the name of Tamasi;

i) In Veszprem megye

of Dorgicse and Kisdorgicse communities under the name of Dorgicse;

of Gyulafiratot community with Veszdprem city under the name of Veszprem;

of Lokut, Nagyesztergar, Olaszfalu communities with Zirc large community under the name of Zirc;

of Padragkut large community with Ajka city under the name of Ajka;

j) In Zala megye

of Csaford, Tekenye, Zalakoppany, Zalaudvarnok communities with Zalaszentgrot large community under the name of Zalaszentgrot;

3. a) Organization of a community council

in Gyorgytarlo community,
in Szendrolad community,
in Tiszababolna community,
and in Tiszakarad community
belonging to Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen megye;

b) In Domos community

and in Pilismarto community
belonging to Komarom megye;

- c) In Hernad community
belonging to Pest megye
 - d) In Nyirad community
and in Osku community
belonging to Veszprem megye;
4. Organization of kkt's (joint community councils):
- a) In Baranya megye
under the name of Nagyvarad and with the seat at Nagyvarad and Satorhely;
 - b) In Fejer megye
under the name of Szar and with the seat belonging to the Szar kkt and Szarliget;
 - c) In Somogy megye
under the name of Tab and with the seat belonging to the Tab kkt and the Kanya kkt;
 - d) In Veszprem megye
under the name of Bazsi and with the seat at Bazsi and Sumegpraga;
under the name of Goganfa and with the seat belonging to Hajmasker and Soly;
under the name of Halimba and with the seat belonging to Halimba kkt and Szoc;
 - e) In Zala megye
under the name of Heviz and with the seat at Heviz and Nemesbuk;
under the name of Bagod and with the seat belonging to the Bagod kkt, Kavas and Zalaszentgyorgy
for associate communities.
5. A council membership election must be held in the community of Szendrolad belonging to the Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen megye.
6. The chairman of the Central Statistical Office should attend to the registration in the Gazetteer of the Hungarian People's Republic of the state administrative name changes related to the unifications required by the decree.

7. The measures that are necessary as a consequence of the reorganization should be taken in coordination by the noncouncil organs and the executive committees of the appropriate megye councils.

Execution of the decree is the responsibility of the appropriate megye councils; execution is to begin on 1 January 1984.

Pal Losonczi
Chairman of the Presidential
Council of the Hungarian
People's Republic

Imre Katona
Secretary of the Presidential
Council of the Hungarian
People's Republic

[Decree No 19/1983 of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic on the declaration of certain large communities as cities]

1. The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic decrees:

the following large communities are declared cities:

- a) Szeghalom belonging to Bekes megye,
- b) Encs and
Szerencs belonging to Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen megye,
- c) Mor belonging to Fejer megye,
- d) Heves belonging to Heves megye,
- e) Dorog belonging to Komarom megye,
- f) Paszto belonging to Nograd megye,
- g) Tiszafured belonging to Szolnok megye,
- h) Tamasi belonging to Tolna megye,
- i) Sumeg and
Zirc belonging to Veszprem megye,
- j) Zalaszentgrot belonging to Zala megye.

2. The chairman of the Central Statistical Office should attend to the registration in the Gazetteer of the Hungarian People's Republic of the changes related to the declaration as cities.

3. The measures that are necessary as a consequence of the declaration as cities should be taken in coordination by the noncouncil organs and the executive committees of the appropriate megye councils.

4. Execution of the organization as cities is to begin on 1 January 1984; it is the responsibility of the executive committees of the megye councils to carry out the provisions.

Pal Losonczi
Chairman of the Presidential
Council of the Hungarian
People's Republic

Imre Katona
Secretary of the Presidential
Council of the Hungarian
People's Republic

6691

CSO: 2500/170

NEPSZABADSAG ARTICLE PRAISES WORK OF INTERPOL IN PARIS

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Dec 83 p 16

[Article by Laszlo Szabo: "Interpol, Paris, December 1983. Investigators or Solvers of Criminal Puzzles?"]

[Text] On the top of Interpol's modern seven-story building located just outside Paris there is a radio antenna towering toward the sky. It is with the help of this antenna that data are transmitted to every corner of the world--to the 135 member countries of Interpol--about murderers, bank robbers, drug smugglers, counterfeiters and art thieves. Yes, it was also via this antenna that the world police first learned about the sad fate of our paintings.

The place is swarming with people day and night. The officers on duty have not a moment of rest--they are preparing materials to be transmitted either by radio, telex or picture telegraph. Right now the Interpol office of the Italian police in Rome is asking Paris, that is to say via Paris the Belgrade Interpol office of the Yugoslav police, what they know about two Yugoslav men suspected by Italian police of having killed and robbed an Italian jeweler.

"This coded telegram, for example, just came to us from England asking us whether we have a file on a certain American gentleman, and if we do, what his distinguishing marks and weaknesses are," a long radio message was shown to me by inspector M. Domeon, who had joined the general secretariate of Interpol from the ranks of the French police, and who was showing me around the central headquarters of Interpol. "We gave them what they wanted: he is sensitive to strong odors. And since he is a hostage taking bandit, perhaps they will be able to use the information in neutralizing him."

A similar--and eventually successful--exchange of questions and answers took place last year between the Budapest Interpol office of the Hungarian police and Interpol headquarters in Paris after two Hungarian citizens, Laszlo Varga and Istvan Simon had killed a woman, stolen her car and before Hungarian police could have found out about the murder left the country using valid passports. The Hungarians determined

who the suspects were and the Italians found them and extradited them to us.

"Every 24 hours we send out an average of five hundred such warrants, written in code, to 135 countries around the world, and provide information by radio for 100 to 150 serious, major criminal cases, in part from what our records already contain, and in part from what our member countries send us at our request," informed me chief of information, Laine Jean-Pierre. Today, in the middle of December, even here at Interpol's headquarters outside Paris the big case is that of the seven paintings of Budapest. For although the staff of Interpol is involved in helping to solve thousands of other crimes around the world--by analyzing data, requesting and forwarding information-- the case of the seven Hungarian paintings receives information hourly, from every corner of the world. They are evaluated and if necessary forwarded to the Hungarian police.

"The investigation to find the paintings and the thieves is conducted by the Hungarian police," informs me assistant secretary general, Raymond E. Kendall, who had been one of Scotland Yard's best known homicide inspectors. "The national police investigates all cases; we assist them, but in the classical sense we are not investigating."

Professionals or Amateurs?

The art theft of the decade, nevertheless, is closely followed by the entire Interpol. On the desk of each of its headquarter's--altogether --110 police investigators one can find photos of the seven paintings and the "warrant sheets" containing the specifications, description data and the history of the paintings, all of which are indispensable for identification. The head of the "art treasures section," inspector M. Berouiguet has put these on the walls of his room, next to the 12 presently most sought after stolen paintings of the world, including works by Goya, Cranach, Murillo, Chagall, Toulouse-Lautrec, Picasso and Gauguin none of which, however, have been appraised to have the insurance value of Raphael's "Eszterhazy Madonna." This one is listed on the warrant sheet to be worth \$20 million. The other Raphael painting is listed at \$10 million and the remaining five--which also include two works by Tintoretto--at \$1 million each. It is rare even in the "dark world" of international art treasure trade for seven works of such great value to disappear all at once...

"A few days ago the London gold robbery was still our most valuable case, although actually the only point of similarity between the two has been the need in both cases to recover the stolen treasures," adds inspector Berouiguet. "This was one of the reasons why as soon as we learned from our Hungarian colleagues the next day about the stealing of the paintings we took immediate steps to ensure that the warrant sheet used in such cases, together with the photos of the seven paintings go out to the 134 member countries of Interpol as soon as possible. Upon arrival, the warrant sheets and photographs

were duplicated by each of the 134 national offices of Interpol which subsequently distributed them to every police station, museum, gallery and even to the better known art dealers of their respective countries. Hence, should there be an attempt made anywhere to sell one of the Hungarian paintings the local police can immediately intervene."

Another Interpol specialist, Rainer Schmiedt-Nothen--who just a few weeks ago was asked by his Hungarian colleagues on the scene at the Budapest Museum of Fine Arts for his professional advice--has been of the opinion from the start that the perpetrators were burglars who were familiar with the local conditions, and who have committed the crime on the encouragement or order of international criminals.

"Were they professionals or amateurs?" I asked.

"At the Paris headquarters of Interpol they have long stopped taking bets on whether a crime was committed by professionals or amateurs."

Indeed, until he is found it cannot be determined for certain whether the perpetrator was a professional or an amateur. For what happened a while back?

"In Skopje someone stole a drawing by Picasso which he had donated to that city after the earthquake. The thief was able to get to the well-guarded picture by disconnecting the sophisticated alarm. Even the very best of the local investigating profession swore: it could only have been done by a professional. So the specifications and a photo of the picture were quickly rushed off to Interpol headquarters, and from there to every European member country and to the United States where on the black market of stolen art treasures many notable works have disappeared already."

"We analyzed the files of hundreds of potential suspects, until the attention of West German police was caught by an innocent-looking West German university student with no prior criminal record after he had launched a multi-million dollar offer in the underworld... He was caught, and as it turned out he was the world's most unprofessional art treasure thief, who with a completely accidental move was able to disconnect the alarm and thus make off with the world famous work of art."

"Do you know how long it took to catch him? A year and a half..., " answered immediately inspector Domeon. "But there is no other way to do this except with patience. In my opinion the Hungarian police are doing their job very well. They do not act with haste or lose their patience. They get to the bottom of every piece of data."

Their Weapon is Their Pen

Just as all of his other colleagues at the general secretariate, Rainer Schmiedt-Nothen could not stress it enough that the Interpol does not have the right to conduct investigations.

"You mean, you do not even carry a weapon?"

"No! Our weapon is our pen. Whatever we are able to elucidate from the enormous amount of data arriving to us we write down and forward via radio to the police of the country in question."

"So if you were to run into the thieves who stole our paintings you could not arrest them because you do not have a weapon..."

"No, and it is not our job to arrest them. It must be done by the Hungarian colleagues or by the police of the country where they appear. Our job is to provide good information and usable answers to the questions addressed to us. But rest assured, the paintings will be recovered. They are too valuable. The perpetrators will also be found," he told me reassuringly, just as everyone else did at Interpol's headquarters outside Paris when they found out that I was a Hungarian journalist.

A strange police, this Interpol. These rooms have never witnessed the interrogation of any criminals or the planning of any investigative actions. Yet, in the silence of these rooms many ideas and carefully considered plans have been conceived--after all there are highly trained detectives working here from 31 member countries--which have contributed to the solving of some of the world's biggest international crime cases. The criminal records of Interpol contain the personal data, methods, favorite pastime, fingerprints, circle of friends--and many other, for the solving of the case often indispensable personality marks--of 3 million criminals.

It was Interpol that provided Scotland Yard with information about one of the recently apprehended suspects in the London gold robbery --the perpetrators poured gasoline on him just as they did on his two colleagues so that they would not set off the alarm too soon--who could directly infiltrate airport security. The first card in the alphabetized records happens to contain the name and personal data of a Hungarian-born counterfeiter. He is Bela Abai, who 18 years ago forged a considerable amount of Canadian dollars in Canada, using sophisticated methods. He still has not been caught. And he only has 2 more years to go...

"This is because we only keep warrant data for 20 years. When that period expires so does the case. However, if somebody is caught during that time his name is reentered into Interpol's data files for another 20 years, starting from the last day of his sentence. This counterfeiter's time is slowly running out," said M. Domeon, after which he invited me to a room where one can find every counterfeit money in the world worth mentioning together with the real bills. The most prominent place in this fascinating collection belongs to the American dollar.

Fifty-thousand to Sixty-thousand Mercedes, BMW's a Year

Which country's sons are the most frequently involved in this crime?

"The Italians," reply two people at once at the counterfeit currencies division.

There are so many counterfeit liras in circulation already that the Italian state is contemplating replacing its currency. Precision, high-technology and a sense of art--these are the secrets to making good counterfeits. I was told a story by the secretary general of Interpol Andre Bossard about the case of a French counterfeiter who was able to copy hundred frank bills so perfectly--he even made the thread-mark of the paper virtually flawless--that his crime went unnoticed for six years, even though thousands of these counterfeit hundred frank bills had passed through the banks.

"Yet, if you look at it closely the thread-mark is not entirely perfect; the real one is a bit darker, the counterfeit is somewhat lighter," said one of the distinguished Italian experts on counterfeit currencies, holding both the real and the forged bills against the light. He is also the editor, for example, of a monthly journal put out by Interpol which publishes the newest counterfeiting methods and attempts, together with the latest identification and "detection" possibilities, and which is kept in the most secret vaults of 135 police agencies and national banks around the world. It was in this periodical that they published the world's clumsiest--and saddest--looking counterfeit, the original of which is in the files of Interpol. It is one of several dozen Turkish hundred lira bills handdrawn by a young Turk who was passing them out completely free of charge to poverty-stricken Turkish families.

Most of the people who work at Interpol's headquarters are French. Including the secretary general. To a journalist coming from a socialist country the question, therefore, inevitably occurs whether this international police is not partial to one of the Western countries. The answer to this question was given by the secretary general.

"It is precisely because of the strong independence of the member countries that the Interpol must respect the sovereignty of its member countries' police forces, for this will ensure that differing world views do not interfere with the mutual cooperation among the world's law enforcement agencies in helping each other to track down, expose and extradite people who have committed a legal crime. What is most important is the steps which local police agencies are taking to combat criminals. During my recent visit there I gathered very good impressions about our Hungarian national office in Budapest which is staffed entirely by Hungarian officers. These Hungarian officers are highly trained professionals who, I feel, are taking good advantage of the possibilities which Interpol has provided Hungary for solving crimes of international dimensions."

Later the conversation shifted to some of Interpol's successful undertakings. As an example, the secretary general recalled the lawless activities of some highly organized gangs who used to hijack semi-trucks on the freeways of Europe, shooting the drivers who resisted.

"The gang leaders in these cases were also Italian."

"Are there many Italian criminals in the international underworld?"

"Yes, there are very many of them. The maffia has also become internationalized. It is true, for example, that the Italian police, with the help of Interpol, has been able to drive back and eliminate these truck-looting crime gangs... Unfortunately, however, there is a new branch on the rise within the car-theft industry which has Italian criminals behind it. Every year 50,000 to 60,000 Mercedes, BMW's and other types of large cars are stolen and shipped to the used car dealers of small African countries. Putting an end to this will also require close Interpol cooperation."

"And what about our paintings?"

"They will be found. It may take a couple of years, but they will be found. Art experts around the world know about them, and the criminals who stole them want to turn them into money... For they are probably professionals who are ready to do anything for money..."

"Perhaps even to kill?"

"Well?! We are talking about a lot of money."

The Search for the Paintings Continues

There are a great many murder cases in connection with which the Interpol is looking for suspects and is providing information to various national police agencies. Right now they are preparing an international warrant for the arrest of two Italian murderers together with the exact specifications of the weapon that was used to commit the crime. This despite the fact that it is one of the rarest types of pistols in the world. But here, at the Paris headquarters they know every existing type of handgun, and although they have no armouries their reference collection is complete.

Which, of course, does not mean that the room of specialized officer and weapons expert Christian Chanet should not look like a showroom of weapon specialities. To be sure, every one of the special weapons displayed here is from the time he was still an "active" policeman. The only things he keeps in his display cabinet are special weapons, hand-granades, explosive devices and ammunition which at one time were used or attempted to be used in the commission of a crime. The deadly "fountain pen" that can be loaded with a military rifle shell and be fired by pulling back the "cap" is a seemingly harmless writing

instrument. It had been used three times to take a human life before police discovered the secret of the instrument.

Inspector Chanet does not really need this display cabinet for making actual comparisons. His Interpol work is much better served by the countless number of books which contain data on every existing make of handgun in the world. In 7 years he has been asked to provide professional information to 116 countries, and he has been able to answer most of these questions.

Just as the work of his colleagues at Interpol, his job resembles more to working in a puzzle-solving workshop than in inspector Maigret's interrogation room. How then does this further the investigation of particular crimes? We have already been able to appreciate its help in connection with the Varga murder and in the course of our ongoing search for the suspects in the paintings case. Let us hope the it will help us recover our irreplaceable paintings and apprehend the perpetrators. For although the investigation in this case is also primarily the duty of the Hungarian police, we hoped that they will also be effectively helped in their efforts by the international criminal "puzzle-solvers", the staff of Interpol.

And after all this the reader can rightfully ask: what is the situation with the famous paintings, and what is the status of the investigation by Hungarian police?

We have received information that our police is continuing its investigation with unrelenting vigor. It is working in close cooperation with the general secretariate of Interpol, as well as with the police forces of several European countries. In the course of its investigation it has uncovered some important and tangible information regarding the identity of the suspects and the whereabouts of the pictures. In the interest of the investigation--and of the apprehension of the suspects and the recovery of the paintings-- however, it has not been able to provide us with further information.

They have promised to give us more information without delay as soon as it becomes feasible.

9379
CSO: 2500/173

POLAND

POLISH GERMANS SEEK TO EMIGRATE TO FRG

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 16 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by ckn: "One Hundred Twenty Thousand Germans Want To Emigrate From the Oder-Neisse Region"]

[Text] Bonn, 15 Dec--There is evidence that at least 120,000 Germans in the Oder-Neisse region, and in adjacent areas of the People's Republic of Poland, wish to emigrate to the FRG. Speaking for the federal government, State Minister Mertes of the Foreign Office gave this information to Member of Parliament Lenz (CDU) in response to questions regarding population figures in the Oder-Neisse region. According to these data, 11 million people now live in the Oder-Neisse region: between the Western national border of Poland (according to Article 1 of the Warsaw Treaty of 1970) and the Eastern national border of the German Reich as of 1937, and the Danzig [Gdansk] area. Under the laws of the People's Republic of Poland, they are Polish nationals. To the knowledge of German authorities, 91 percent of the total population are Poles--that is about 10 million, half of whom were born in this region after 1945. One million of the total 11 million inhabitants are Germans in the sense of Article 116 of the Bonn Basic Law.

As Mertes points out in his reply, the FRG has an obligation to protect those Germans, which Poland--although to a limited extent--takes into account in German-Polish talks on emigration possibilities for Germans from the Oder-Neisse region. The federal government insists on the realization of the ethnic rights of these people in the sense of the international Human Rights Act, the Final Act of Helsinki, and lasting understanding between the two peoples. Of primary concern are respect for, and use of, their native tongue, especially in school and church. In the interest of all parties concerned, this might weaken their desire to leave their ancestral homeland for the FRG, according to Mertes.

The total number of Germans to whom the FRG feels particularly obligated, is about 1.1 million people, according to the state minister's figures. They also include 100,000 Germans living outside the Oder-Neisse region, particularly in eastern Upper Silesia. It is impossible to determine precisely the number of Germans living in the national territory of the People's Republic of Poland who wish to emigrate to the FRG. The federal government only has two base figures: the number of persons applying for

emigration, plus those known cases where families of tourists who remained in Germany, wish to follow them. During 1981 and 1982 there were 42,000 such cases. Together, these two groups comprise 120,000 individuals known to the federal government as definitely wanting to emigrate. Secondly, there are 500,000 people who still live on Polish national territory but have already received numbers on the "Polish lists," i.e., have been taken over by the German side. Among these are also Polish spouses of German emigration applicants. But according to Mertes, many of these people are evidently not determined to make use of the option and actively pursue the move. Many of them regularly obtain tourist visas, spend a short time in the FRG and then return home. They only use the chance to get a visa from the German authorities at any time. Some of them would probably remain in the FRG if it did not mean splitting up the family.

The federal government estimates 1,000 to 2,000 Germans for Danzig [Gdansk]. This number is based on data gathered by the Protestant church which lists about 3,000 Protestant Christians who are practically identical with Germans and remained in Elbing, Danzig, Pomerania and West Prussia.

Mertes points out that these population figures cannot be considered absolutely reliable since the sources used give differing data. In statistics on the number of Germans, one cannot differentiate between German in the meaning of Article 116 of the Bonn Basic Law and ethnic Germans, since the normal take-over procedure makes no distinction between these two groups and, therefore, they are not listed separately in the files. Between 1950 and 1982, 713,488 emigrants from the Polish national territory were settled in the Federal Republic. From January to November 1983, the number amounted to 17,209.

9917

CSO: 2300/216

INDEPENDENT POSITION IN EAST BLOC DISCUSSED BY BONN JOURNAL

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT in German 17 Dec 83 Supplement pp 29-38

[Article by Dionisie Ghermani]

[Text] To outsiders it may appear to be curious that of all Warsaw Pact and CEMA member countries, the one that in domestic policy has preserved most of the characteristics of Stalinism was able to achieve a relatively high degree of independence from the Bloc as regards economic and foreign policy. Moreover, the thesis advocated by East experts in the seventies, according to which the far-reaching foreign policy independence of this Balkan country necessarily had to be bought with internal lack of freedom only partially coincides with reality. Of course, Bucharest could not advocate internal liberalization if it wanted to pursue the course of emancipation from Moscow. The examples of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 thoroughly deterred all potential imitators. However, the weak and unpopular RCP never had the intention to loosen the domestic-policy reins. Apart from the fact that in case of a liberalization it had to expect the development of uncontrollable inherent laws, even the idea of delegating significant competences to subordinate bodies or corporate bodies is far from the mind of the dictator Ceausescu. Even during the interwar years Romania essentially was a proforma democracy and the people had hardly any opportunity to become familiar with democratic rules.

Romania's intensive contacts with the movement of the bloc-free states on the other hand does not mean that Ceausescu is considering leaving the East European alliance system, if for no other reason than that his position in the country is so shaky that he cannot do without the psychological backing of the "fraternal parties." Even though Moscow's goodwill must matter to him, Ceausescu adheres to the idea of full equality and independence of all communist states and parties. This specifically Romanian concept of a world of "socialist fatherlands" had its origin in the Ninth Party Congress of July 1965, the party congress at which Nicolae Ceausescu was appointed party general secretary. This congress adopted a new party statute in which the basic principles of "socialist division of labor" to which communist Romania feels obligated were enumerated.¹ Since then Romania has repeatedly pointed out that these principles have already been formally accepted by all communist parties.

Both the desire for maximum possible independence as well as the penchant of the present party leadership toward a neo-Stalinist tyranny, are rooted in Romania's

and the RCP's history. It is in vain to look for another Warsaw Pact member country whose policies are shaped as strongly as are Romania's by national nostalgias and historical sensitivities. This led to a syncretized ideology full of paradoxes, based on an extreme nationalism and just as radical unique "internationalism." A bizarre dialectic that contains Marxist ideas only as trace elements has made this possible. Its creator of course derived for himself the claim to be one of the very great innovators of communism. And Romanian historiography regards the time prior to 1965 to belong to communist prehistory,

I. RCP Ideology: a Mixture of Historical Traditions and National-egocentric Self-image

The national-egocentric self-image of the Romanian communists was latently present even before the RCP leadership could even consider to articulate it programmatically. The RCP, politically unimportant during the interwar years², to a considerable part consisted of "allogenic elements (in the vernacular: unassimilable foreigners, especially Transylvanian Hungarians, Jews, and Ukrainians) and even the Central Committee general secretaries imposed on it by the Comintern were no Romanians and did not even have perfect command of the Romanian language, which has been especially sharply denounced by the Ceausescu era's historiography.³ They were "creatures of foreign interests: and served foreign powers, not Romania, and not the Romanian people."⁴

1. The Political Prerequisites for National Emancipation

There is no doubt of the fact that Stalin himself shifted the switches for the Romanization of the RCP when in 1952, then to the complete surprise of the uninitiated, he dropped the group around Ana Pauker who had stayed in the USSR during World War II and had close connections to the Kremlin, and confirmed Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a communist who had remained in Romania and later on was arrested, as Central Committee first secretary. From the very beginning, there had been frictions between the "Muscovite" faction, the majority of whom consisted of members of national minorities and had returned to Romania in the wake of the Soviet Army, and the "indigenous" faction, headed by the former railroad worker Gheorghiu-Dej, which consisted of ethnic Romanians only, since both raised the claim to leadership. Of course, the intraparty power struggle had to be postponed until the "class enemy" was liquidated and the RCP succeeded in expanding its cadre basis. The conflict between the two wings erupted in the open in 1951. Stalin, who in the year preceding his death had started his last "anti-Zionist action," decided against the Jewess Pauker. Thus the "Romanization" of the RCP was initiated.⁵

Furthermore, decisive for the later RCP ideological and foreign-policy metamorphosis was the decision cleverly suggested to Khrushchev by the RCP top functionaries to withdraw the Soviet troops "temporarily stationed" in Romania on the basis of the Paris peace treaty.⁶ Thus Bucharest got rid of a troublesome controller who watched over its good behavior concerning alliance loyalty and "internationalist solidarity."

Moscow could hardly expect that Bucharest would take the justification for its later emancipation policy from the "Conference of the Communist and Workers Parties" convoked by the CPSU, which was held as part of the festivities "on the occasion

of the 43d anniversary of the Great October revolution.⁷ The definition contained in the final documents of this conference was to prove to be of fundamental importance to the RCP political self-image in subsequent years: "The socialist camp is the social, economic, and political community of free and sovereign people which are united by close ties of international socialist solidarity and by the unity of the common interests and goals and follow the path to socialism and communism....The socialist states, which are guided by the principles of complete equality, mutual advantages, and comradely mutual assistance are perfecting all-around economic, political, and cultural cooperation, which corresponds to the interests of each socialist state as well as also to the interests of the entire socialist camp."⁸ It can be regarded as certain that this definition, co-authored by the CPSU leadership, was not interpreted as renunciation of its claim to primacy or even as a call to its satellites to become independent. This Moscow "conference" was the last international meeting of communist parties in which the CCP, which repeatedly gave support to the stubborn Romanians in the late sixties and in the seventies, participated.

2. Main Theses of the Bucharest Doctrine

The break between Beijing and Moscow constituted a welcome occasion for Bucharest to initiate and pursue its emancipation course toward Moscow. The RCP leadership of course refrained from directly intervening in the dispute of the two giants; rather it offered its good offices as mediator, but at the same time took advantage of the opportunity to define more clearly its own unorthodox ideology. After several starts, in which it emphasized its independence with growing forcefulness, the RCP leadership was ready in 1964. The RCP had a "Declaration on the Point of View of the Romanian Workers Party on Questions of the International Communist and Workers Movement" published in the central press organ; the declaration had been adopted by the Central Committee plenum on 22 April. In it it "recommended" to Beijing and Moscow "immediate cessation of the public polemic." But of greater significance for the further political development of the RCP and its ideological self-image were some declarations of principle also contained in the document. A Lenin quotation torn out of the larger context, in which the founder of the USSR spoke of the necessity of the ideological and political adjustment to the "national peculiarities" concerned, served Bucharest as cornerstone and ideological figleaf."⁹

The Central Committee plenum in its "April declaration" emphatically pointed out that Bucharest rejects the transfer of national state functions to "supranational organs." A "planning system superordinate to all CEMA countries would entail extremely serious economic and political complications." Furthermore, economic planning, according to the declaration, is "a basic, essential, and inalienable attribute of sovereignty of every socialist state....Sovereignty would become a concept devoid of substance if only one lever were transferred to the competence of supranational organs." Moreover, Romania is fighting for expansion of international cooperation also between countries of a "differing social order." Finally, according to the declaration, the RCP advocates abolition of all military blocs.

The new RCP doctrine received a definitive form at the Ninth Party Congress held on 19-24 July 1965. The principles, valid to the present, were presented by the newly appointed party general secretary Ceausescu and the old-communist Emil Bodnaras to the shocked guests from the socialist "fraternal countries" and a completely surprised public. These principles are:

"1. Nation and state will continue to form the foundations of the socialist society for a long time. The development of the nation and the stability of the socialist state correspond to the objective requirements of social life; this does not contradict in any way the interests of socialist internationalism but, on the contrary, is in full accord with it.

"2. The nation as a historical formation, far from being outdated, finds the prerequisite to be able to prevail and stand its ground only in socialism. Thus independence and sovereignty of the nation and the socialist state are objectively justified demands.

"3. Only between independent and sovereign socialist nations and states with equal rights does proletarian internationalism receive content and reality, does it represent the authentic embodiment of the ... united forces of all."¹⁰

The strange syncretism between internationalism and nationalism was perfect, the dispute with the allies concerning the true interpretation of the "classics" had started and is being passionately continued to this day. These Romanian theses do not lack current explosiveness, especially in the Andropov era that started only a year ago. The "amalgamation theory" is again held in high regard, especially in the USSR. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR on 21 December 1982, Andropov, to justify the Soviet ambitions, referred to Lenin's goal to bring in the long term the nations and the states of the world "not only closer to one another but also to amalgamate them."¹¹ Subsequently Ceausescu was content with reiterating his well known theses on various occasions. However, in April 1983 he also had the deputy section chief for propaganda in the Central Committee, Eugen Florescu, brusquely respond to Andropov--of course without mentioning the name. In two fundamental articles Florescu rejected the "amalgamation theory" as "obsolete" and "unrealistic."¹² In 1983 representatives of other Bloc states also intervened in the newly started polemic in favor of the Soviet point of view.

II. Romania in the Ceausescu Era

Romania's political, social, and economic life is so much shaped by the person of the RCP general secretary and state president, Ceausescu, that the "court ideologists" hardly ever deal with the development of their party prior to 1965. Instead the value of a historical fact is attributed to every doctrinaire declaration by the "leader of the state and the people," as Ceausescu is referred to by the media. The personality cult around Ceausescu and the members of his family endowed with important positions must look like an anachronism in the present-day communist world.¹³ Ceausescu is being pictured as sole creator of present-day Romania; the identification of the communist autocrat with his work appears to be complete. There is not a single sphere of policy and public life that has not been shaped by him.

1. Domestic Policy Inconsistencies

Since the beginning of the seventies, the Romanians have fewer rights and personal liberties than the inhabitants of all other countries of the socialist camp. This is all the more astonishing because during the first years following Ceausescu's assumption of power, he supported or instituted some liberalization measures. In 1964, his predecessor Gheorghiu-Dej, under pressure from several Western governments, had released a majority of the political prisoners from the prisons and gradually integrated them in the work process. An important element in the process of change was the "reconciliation" with the intellectuals to whom Ceausescu had explained his new political line immediately following the Ninth Party Congress to gain their support for his nationally-centered course.¹⁴

In the spring of 1965, Bucharest decreed the opening of the borders to international tourism¹⁵ and thus, without saying a word, made contacts possible between Romanians and foreigners. Simultaneously a broadly conceived campaign to rehabilitate the "great men" of Romanian history that had been discredited under Soviet influence, whereby their political conviction or "class membership" played only an insignificant role.¹⁶ The national history was speedily rewritten in accordance with this concept.¹⁷ In the second half of the sixties, the activities of the security apparatus were clearly restricted and the competent authorities handled the issuance of passports for private purposes more unbureaucratically. In addition, there were beginnings of greater consideration towards the national minorities.¹⁸

Primarily the country's cultural life had greatly profited from this political "thaw" that temporarily displaced "socialist realism." The so-called "small cultural revolution" triggered by Ceausescu after his return from a China trip during the summer of 1971 caused a sudden end to all these innovations. The causes for this unexpected change of course remain a puzzle to this date. However, it is probable that Ceausescu feared that the liberalization efforts tolerated by him could get out of hand; thereupon Mao advised him to tighten the reins.¹⁹ However, the inability of the "leader of the state and the people" to think and act in liberal categories also contributed to the renewed change of course.

Apart from this partial return to pre-1964 conditions, Ceausescu adhered without change to the nationally centered interpretation of history and to the patriotic direction of literature and the arts. The rights and liberties of the people were once again restricted in the early eighties following the sharpening of the economic crisis which brought Romania to the edge of insolvency, caused disastrous domestic supply bottlenecks and reduced the living standard to a postwar low.

2. Romania's Economic Concept and Practice

The economic concept of the RCP leadership can be outlined in a few sentences: a precondition for an acceptable independent policy is the reduction of the economic dependence on CEMA existing since 1965; at the same time, economic relations to the rest of the world must be developed and the development of Romania's own industry must be accelerated (at the expense of agriculture); this reorientation requires ideological underpinning. This was defined as the "opening toward all sides."

When Bucharest in the mid-sixties first cautiously started to loosen the ties with the Warsaw Pact and with CEMA, its economy was greatly dependent on that of its alliance partners. The CEMA share in Romania's 1960 foreign trade amounted to 66.62 percent, the USSR share alone was 40.10 percent. During the interwar years, West Europe's industrial countries had been Romania's most important trade partners. Some of them were nearly completely lost to Romania during the first postwar period.

The trade was quickly reoriented after 1960, a process that was tremendously accelerated by Romania's accession to the IMF and the World Bank--as the first CEMA country--as well as to various UN organizations in the early seventies. The CEMA and (calculated separately) the Soviet share in Romanian foreign trade subsequently declined rapidly:²⁰

<u>Year</u>	<u>CEMA, Total in %</u>	<u>USSR, in %</u>
1965	60.33	38.75
1970	49.06	27.01
1975	37.50	18.56
1980	32.08	17.45
1981	41.50	18.12

Thus at the beginning of the eighties, Romania had the smallest foreign trade share by a wide margin among all CEMA countries within the Bloc. At present this trend again seems to be reversed in view of Romania's foreign debt to the hard currency countries estimated at roughly 15 billion dollars. Since 1975 the trade share of the USSR has no longer been subject to any serious fluctuations. While Bucharest has succeeded since 1982 in obtaining positive terms of trade in transactions with the Western industrial countries, this has, however, been possible only by a drastic reduction of the foreign trade as a whole. Romania's ambitious export plans could not be implemented in view of the lacking competitiveness of many Romanian industrial products. Therefore, Bucharest lately does not shy away from any attempt to seek more support from CEMA--of course, without wanting to give up the political leeway it has gained. But these efforts were largely unsuccessful at the CEMA conference of Prague (1980), Sofia (1981), Budapest (1982), and East Berlin (1983). According to available incomplete data, the CEMA share in 1982 Romanian foreign trade did increase; however, this happened because Romania's trade with the convertible currency countries in absolute terms decreased even more than that with the "fraternal countries." Obviously it continues to decline.

Up to the beginning of the eighties, Romania's foreign trade with the non-CEMA countries had developed in a spectacular manner:²¹

<u>Year</u>	<u>OECD (in %)</u>	<u>Third World (in %)</u>
1960	22.39	10.99
1965	19.18	10.49
1970	35.91	15.03
1975	38.52	23.98
1980	33.74	34.18
1981	33.66	35.69

Accordingly, the share of the Third World (including the PRC and Yugoslavia) is constant toward the end of the period being analyzed and has definitely grown at the expense of the OECD share. Romania, which found itself compelled to ask the Western creditor countries for a moratorium during the winter of 1981/1982, had to cut down the imports of machines and equipment from this region toward the end of the seventies. However, it did not go far enough in this correct direction and, moreover, also increased its debts to the OPEC states whose petroleum deliveries it hoped in vain to pay for with agricultural and industrial exports and with technology transfer. Countries such as Iran and Iraq, with which Romania maintained hardly any foreign trade relations in the mid-sixties, achieved share rankings 4 and 5 at the beginning of the eighties.²²

However, even if Romania had been spared the effects of the world economic crisis, its economic policy would have failed sooner or later. The RCP leadership did not recognize until much too late that Romania must pursue differentiated international economic cooperation and division of labor if it wants to keep up with comparable countries and avoid economic collapse. For example, Hungary and Bulgaria have achieved passable results in developing their economic relations with foreign countries owing to a loosening of their planned economy. Even after establishing joint ventures, which it was the first to introduce among the CEMA countries, Romania has not reduced its notoriously rigorous centralism.²³ Some mixed companies had to be abandoned after a while because of unsatisfactory results.²⁴ And cooperation within CEMA, which the founding member Romania had systematically avoided since 1964, could never really develop.²⁵

Of course, the RCP has also been responsible for additional poor performances in the economic field. The criminal neglect of the agricultural economy and the constant attempt to eliminate or conceal²⁶ obvious shortcomings by changes in personnel and organizational measures have ruined every attempt at revitalizing the economy.

Forced industrialization at the expense of the people's standard of living proved to have great negative consequences. As late as 1982 when the economic crisis had already started with full force, a Romanian economist pointed with pride to the supposed achievements of the seventies that would stand out from those of other countries and groups of countries: "Between 1970 and 1980, the average

national income of the CEMA states grew 66 percent, however that of the developed capitalist countries merely 38 percent. The growth of the EC countries by themselves was even smaller, 28 percent." The economist said that industry again had recorded growths of 84 percent (CEMA), 37 percent (OECD, total) and 25 percent (EC). But the corresponding growth rates in Romania were as follows: 141 percent (national income), 190 percent (industrial production), and 185 percent (productive capital assets).²⁷ The fact that Romania now has partly obsolete machinery and unused capacities without being able to modernize by urgently needed imports is not being mentioned just as there is silence about the poor working morale of large parts of the inadequately paid labor force and the wide-spread corruption. Under existing circumstances it would be difficult even for a much more efficient management than the existing one to stimulate the worn-out economy.²⁸

3. The Independent Foreign Policy

As regards foreign policy, Bucharest has succeeded since 1964 to go its own way despite a frequently very acute threat to its existence by the USSR. The policy of "opening toward all sides" served Romania not only for the worldwide expansion of its diplomatic contacts but at the same time for the international image of its party head. Ceausescu gained much prestige outside the Warsaw Pact as spokesman of the "small and medium-sized states" regardless of their social order, as a representative of the interests of the developing countries,²⁹ as a champion of the peace and disarmament idea on the basis of the United Nations, the CSCE, and many other international forums,³⁰ however especially because of his active role as a mediator in the East-West and North-South conflicts as well as in several regions of tension. His foreign policy regarded overall as successful of course has diverted the public opinion of the noncommunist world from the domestic policy situation of the country.

a. Policy Within the Bloc

Since 1964, main components of Romanian foreign policy have been Ceausescu's efforts to get rid of the Soviet claim to hegemony. The attempts by the RCP leadership between 1964 and 1968 to bring about a reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing were weak and were mainly undertaken to disassociate itself from the USSR within the Bloc and to get an international image. In final analysis, Bucharest was also striving to get China's backing for its autonomy course. The Soviet-Chinese dispute was very opportune for Romania because it vividly proved that there can be, and should be, different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism corresponding to the national realities within the established communist parties. Thus it is not surprising that a high party functionary, in sharp contrast to Moscow's centralist view, stated at the Tenth RCP Congress in the summer of 1969: "The party, by giving back to the nation the memory of its everlasting virtues, performed one of its most significant acts of justice."³¹ Thus the first duty of every party in the eyes of the RCP was its own nation. However, there was hardly any mention of an obligation toward the communist world movement.

The Romanian-Soviet differences had of course reached a first crisis a year earlier in connection with the occupation of Czechoslovakia by military units of all Warsaw Pact states with the exception of Romania. Only owing to the committed backing by the communist parties of China, Italy, and Spain as well as some other

nonaligned countries was Ceausescu able to get away with attacking Moscow directly: "The troops of the five socialist countries, without having been asked by the legal and elected organs of the country, have forced their way into Czechoslovakia under the pretext that a certain group has asked them to do so." Thus Bucharest frankly contradicted the Soviet version. Considering that the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which could also be applied in the case of Romania, Ceausescu decided that "only the elected organs of the party and the state concerned ... carry the responsibility for the fate of their nation."³² Since 1967 Romania had logically refused to participate in Warsaw Pact maneuvers or to permit the holding of such maneuvers on Romanian territory. The condemnation of the suppression of the "Prague Spring" at that time was shared by large parts of the Romanian population. Nevertheless Ceausescu had reached the high point of his popularity.

Romania's relations with the USSR and in varying degree to the other allies since then have remained unchanged tense and the latent conflict now and then intensifies into threatening crises. Looking at Bucharest, Moscow pointed out then and repeatedly thereafter the duty of all parties to do their duty "not only to the working class---but also to the communist world movement as a whole."³³ The RCP leadership of course had repudiated communist unity under Moscow's leadership for a long time and at the same time declared that it is determined to oppose categorically any aggression regardless of the direction from which it originates and of the reason that it uses. Since 1968, maneuvers of the Romanian army typically are being deliberately held against an assumed enemy trying to cross the Romanian border from the northeast.³⁴

Bucharest also emphatically opposed Moscow's repeated efforts to establish a new communist power center. According to a programmatic article, the communist camp speaks of the strengthening of the unity and regrets that it does not exist. In doing so, there is obviously an inclination to forget the abuses to which "the unity centrally imposed and controlled" (by Comintern and Cominform) had led. What immense harm has been committed, for example, by the fact that "many a communist party (Yugoslavia's LCY) was denounced as an agency of imperialism." Similar things happen even today (PRC).³⁵

Since 1968, Bucharest has been openly backing the Chinese card. Significant in terms of Bloc policy was especially the visit, fateful to Romania in terms of domestic policy, paid by Ceausescu to Mao during the summer of 1971. In an address to the Chinese parliament, Ceausescu again emphatically rejected the idea of a new edition of the communist international.³⁶ Host Chou Enlai reciprocated with superlative praise of the Romanians and openly promised them Chinese support against every "foreign aggressor."³⁷ Seven years later it could be ascertained that on this occasion Ceausescu had undertaken the first successful attempt to act as mediator between Beijing and Washington.

b. Bucharest's Worldwide Political Engagement

Ceausescu placed the mediator activity in the center of his worldwide diplomatic activities because, under the pretext of being nonpartisan and neutral, this activity opened many doors which until then had remained closed to him and created freedom for foreign-policy initiatives of his own. Outside of the communist area

he created in 1967--the year in which Romania established diplomatic relations with the FRG, long before the other Warsaw Pact states except for the USSR³⁸ -- the basis for one of the most successful mediations, the one between Egypt and Israel by not breaking off diplomatic relations with Jerusalem as the only party chief of an East Bloc country on account of the "Six-day War" from 5 to 10 June 1967. Some Arab states, including Egypt, thereupon temporarily suspended their relations with Bucharest. However, these relations were reestablished at the beginning of the seventies. From 19 to 21 November 1977, the sensational meeting between Anwar as-Sadat and Menachem Begin took place in Jerusalem following prior contacts via Romania.

As expected, this mediation action also brought the United States closer to Romania. In the summer of 1969, the newly elected President Nixon had already rewarded "Romania's openmindedness in the Near East policy" with a visit--the first by a U.S. president--to Bucharest.³⁹ And 9 years later, President Carter, too, confirmed to the Romanian party and state chief that he was "the great leader...of a great nation," that he possesses extraordinary influence in the international arena," and that he had built "a bridge between nations with fundamentally different points of view and interests."⁴⁰

Ceausescu had earned this great praise not least by his mediation between Washington and Beijing. Bucharest has maintained good relations with China to the present. In May 1978, immediately following his U.S. visit, Ceausescu again went to Beijing where he undoubtedly transmitted U.S. proposals for improving bilateral relations to his Chinese hosts. Party chief Hua Guofeng received the Romanian guest with usual warmth.⁴¹ The summit meetings between Bucharest and Beijing did not stop subsequently either. In mid-August 1978 Hua Guofeng visited Ceausescu before continuing his travel to Belgrade.⁴² The rapprochement between China and Yugoslavia to a considerable extent is likely to have been Ceausescu's doing, just as the one between Beijing and Teheran, where the Chinese party chief stopped over on his way back to hold informal talks with the Shah. Thus toward the end of the seventies Bucharest could be satisfied to have contributed with its achievement to the development and strengthening of contacts between potential adversaries of the USSR, which, until then, in some cases had been in sharp contrast to one another.

III. Prospects for the Future

Since the beginning of the eighties, Ceausescu's big time as an all-around mediator and as a pioneer of world politics full of initiative appears to be largely over. A visit to China that he made on 12-17 April 1983 is unlikely to have achieved the desired results, primarily an expansion of mutual economic cooperation; among others he met with the pragmatist Teng Xiaoping.⁴³ His efforts to continue to mediate between Israel and the Arab states and between Iran and Iraq will probably remain unsuccessful in view of the rigid fronts and the generally muddled overall situation in the Near East.⁴⁴ For some time the big and super-powers hardly require his good services any longer since they have direct contacts with one another, even though (as has happened) it can be that some members of the U.S. Congress, not very familiar with Romania's status in the East Bloc, ask Bucharest to mediate between Washington and Moscow in the disarmament question.⁴⁵

Romania's loss of prestige on the foreign policy level, which Bucharest still tries to hide behind hectic activity, of course causes fewer worries for the future of the country to the responsible agencies than the extremely precarious and constantly worsening economic situation. Bucharest, it is true, in the medium term could succeed in obtaining positive balances of trade at the expense of the gross national product and the living standard and thus gradually reduce its foreign debts. However, the IMF has lately expressed doubts that it will be possible--as Bucharest had announced--to largely pay off the debts by 1988. This plan is based on two Utopian postulates: namely that the economy by its own effort will be in the position to increase exports considerably in the coming years, disregarding the fact that the world market in the foreseeable future has only limited ability to absorb even technologically first-class products which Romania cannot provide, as has been proven; and furthermore disregarding the fact that starting in 1990 it will be possible despite the in part dwindling own reserves to do without the import of expensive sources of energy to be paid for in convertible currency.⁴⁶ For years one optimistic economic prognosis has been chasing the other--and the situation has been getting continuously worse. Only a radical change in economic views could remedy the matter. However, that is not to be expected.

FOOTNOTES

1. The party statute was first published in the daily press as a draft on 6 June 1965. Soon after the conclusion of the Ninth Party Congress it was published as a brochure in August 1965.
2. V. Grigoryan, "The Strategy and Tactics of Leninism--a Weapon of the Fraternal Communist Parties," in BOLSHEVIK, 17 (1950) 7, p 14. The Soviet author states that the RCP numbered fewer than 1000 members prior to Romania's capitulation on 23 Aug 44.
3. Gh. Ionita M. Musat, "Stages in History Until the Big Forum of November 1974," in: MAGAZIN ISTORIC, (1974) 11, especially p 19. The two authors note that after the RCP founding congress from 8 to 14 May 1921 to the end of World War II, only a single party congress, in Ploiesti in 1922, was held on Romanian soil. The Third Party Congress took place in Vienna in August 1924, where the Hungarian Elek Kolbos was elected general secretary. At the Fourth Party Congress of June 1928, which took place in Kharkov, the Ukrainian Vitaliy Holostenko (cover-name Barbu) was forced on the RCP as Central Committee general secretary; and even at the Fifth Party Congress, held from 3 to 24 December 1931, another Ukrainian, Alexander Danieluk-Stefanski, was imposed as Central Committee general secretary.
4. S. Lache Gh. Tutui, "Romania and the 1946 Peace Conference," Cluj 1978. The two authors condemn in addition to the Comintern also directly the CPSU because of its incorrect assessment of Hitler's intentions and its disastrous directives to the RCP. Their statements are based on data which they took from the Central Committee archives, holding 1, file 167, pp 15-22.

5. D. Ghermani, "The National Sovereignty Policy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Part 1: Within the Framework of the Soviet Alliance System," Munich 1981, especially pp 30-36.
6. "Chruschtschow erinnert sich" (Khrushchev's Memoirs), Hamburg 1971, pp 514-515.
7. NEUER WEG, 2 Dec 60.
8. V.I. Lenin, "Works," Vol 31 (Romanian edition), Bucharest 1956, p 75.
9. SCINTEIA, 26 Apr 64.
10. Ibid., 24 Jul 65. The theses presented by Ceausescu and Bodnaras were not cited separately since they form a unit.
11. PRAVDA, 22 Dec 82.
12. ROMANIA LIBERA, 18 and 25 Apr 83.
13. Concerning Ceausescu's rise to and increase in power, see D. Ghermani, "The Romanian Communist Party," in K.D. Grothusen (publisher) "Suedosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol II, Romania," Goettingen 1977, especially pp 19-41.
14. Cf. "Perspectives of the Bucharest Cultural Policy--Patriotic Slogans in the 'Building of Socialism-Communism,'" in: WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DIENST SUEDESTEUROPA (WDSOE), 14 (1965), pp 60-62.
15. Ibid., p 88
16. Cf. "Bucharest Rehabilitates the 'Unpersons'--National Merits are Decisive," in: WDSOE, pp 89-92.
17. Cf. "National History, a Fresh Look," in: WDSOE, pp 123-125, and D. Ghermani, "Communist Revision of Romanian History With Special Regard for the Middle Ages," Munich 1967, especially pp 124-136.
18. "Paths of Romanian Nationalities Policy--Bucharest and the Minorities," in: WDSOE, 17 (1968), pp 17-18.
19. Cf. "Ceausescu's 'Hard' Ideological Course--Return to the Dogmas of the Fifties?," in WDSOE, 20 (1971), pp 124-128.
20. Author's own calculation according to "Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1982" (1982 Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania), Bucharest 1983, pp 256-258.
21. The nonaligned socialist countries (e.g. PRC and Yugoslavia), whose share in Romanian foreign trade greatly expanded in the seventies, were counted in the "Third World" group of states.

22. Cf. D. Ghermani, "Romania and CEMA," in: SUEDEUROPA, 32 (1983) 9, pp 492-507.
23. Cf. "Foreign Capital in Romania--The 'Mixed Companies' Taking Shape," in: WDSOE, 21 (1972), pp 200-202.
24. R. Schoenfeld, "Joint Ventures With Western Capital Participation in Socialist Countries," in: G. Brunner (publisher), "Commercial Law, International Trade, and Peaceful Coexistence in East European View," Berlin 1982, pp 75-94
25. Cf. "Bucharest Against CEMA Tightening-up--Nationalistic Independence in the Economy, too?," in: WDSOE, 18 (1969), pp 10-12.
26. D. Ghermani, "Romania's Agricultural System in the Organizational Change--a 'Jubilee Reform' 30 Years After Collectivization," in: WDSOE, 28 (1978), pp 74-79, and same author, "Activism in Romanian Agricultural Policy," in: SUEDEUROPA, 31 (1982) 7/8, pp 391-397.
27. F. Magareanu, "Current Problems of Perfecting Economic Cooperation Among CEMA member countries," in: REVISTA ECONOMICA, 9 Jul 82, pp 11-13.
28. D. Ghermani, "Romania's Economic Crisis," in: SUEDEUROPA, 31 (1982) 3/4, pp 207-219.
29. D. Ghermani, "The 'New World Order' as Viewed by the RCP," in: W. Gumpel (publisher), "Southeast Europe in the Developmental Process of the World," Munich 1979, pp 203-226.
30. D. Ghermani, "Romania and the CSCE. Bucharest as Spokesman of the 'Small Countries,'" in: WDSOE, 30 (1981), pp 275-279.
31. The Tenth RCP Congress took place from 6 to 12 Aug 69 in the midst of an acute period of tension in Romanian-Soviet relations.
32. SCINTEIA, 23 Aug 68. Ceausescu delivered this address before the hurriedly convoked Grand National Assembly.
33. PRAVDA, 15 Jan 69.
34. D. Ghermani, "The Romanian People's Army," in: P. Gosztory (publisher), "On the History of the European People's Armies," Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1977, pp 189-226, and same author, "Socialist Republic of Romania," in: R. Wohler (editor), "The Reserve Systems of the Warsaw Pact," Munich 1978, pp 87-98.
35. N. Corbu, "So That the Power of Socialism Fully Develop," in LUMEA, 24 Apr 69.
36. SCINTEIA, 9 Jun 71.

37. Ibid., 2 Jun 71.
38. Assumption of the diplomatic relations between Bonn and Bucharest was agreed to on 31 January 1967 on the occasion of a visit by Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu to the FRG. The first Romanian ambassador, Constantin Oancea, presented his credentials on 14 July 1967.
39. NEUER WEG, 3-5 Aug 69.
40. SCINTEIA, 13 Apr 78. Cf. D. Ghermani, "Ceaurescu's Role in World Diplomacy. Broker in All Directions," in: WDSOE, 27 (1978), pp 98-102, and same author, "Romanian-U.S. Relations in the Ceaurescu Era," in: SUEOSTEUROPA, 31 (1982) 9, pp 459-473.
41. SCINTEIA, 16 May 78.
42. Ibid., 16-19 Aug 78.
43. Ibid., 18 Apr 83.
44. D. Ghermani, "Romania's Near East Policy. Inventory of a Diplomatic Mediator Activity," in: SUEOSTEUROPA, 31 (1982) 1, pp 28-45.
45. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 19 Sep 83.
46. D. Ghermani, "Romania and CEMA," in: SUEOSTEUROPA, 32 (1983) 9, pp 492-507.

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ROMANIA

RELATIONS WITH NONALIGNED COMMUNIST PARTIES

Munich SUEDEST-EUROPA in German Oct 83 pp 551-562

[Article by Dionisie Ghermani: "Romania and the Nonaligned Communist World"]

[Text] Romania's traditionally cool relations with its Warsaw Pact allies since the mid-sixties have not hindered Bucharest, but on the contrary have stimulated it, to develop and intensify the ties to the nonaligned communist states and parties and to the so-called people's democracies in the Third World. Even though the RCP leadership set certain priorities, whereby it gave preference to parties critical of Moscow, at the same time it was striving to maintain contacts with the USSR-line communist parties. Bucharest of course maintains the closest contacts with Yugoslavia and the PRC as well as with the Italian and Spanish communist parties.

The differences in quality of the RCP feeling of solidarity with the individual "sister parties" are revealed in many signs and gestures, for example in the length of the reports and communiques on a summit meeting, whether the statements of solidarity and cooperation sound cliched or demonstrate pronounced friendship, the formulations that are chosen to express the achieved degree of postulated "friendship," etc. The communiques on Ceausescu's meetings with nonaligned colleagues will almost always underscore that they took place in a "cordial and friendly atmosphere." On meetings with colleagues from the other Warsaw Pact states it will as a rule be said that they were characterized by "mutual frankness and comradely spirit." An exception to this rule is Bulgaria to which Bucharest maintains markedly cordial relations not least on account of its regional policy (Balkans). Curiously enough it seems as if this loyal ally of Moscow places a high value on good relations with Bucharest. It remains an open question whether this is being done solely on account of the probable arrangement with Moscow or for considerations of its own.

The different quality of Bucharest's relations with its alliance partners on the one hand and many nonaligned communist states and parties on the other hand is, of course, also reflected in the writings and statements of these countries. The following short excerpts from greeting messages can be regarded as examples of the above, messages that were dispatched by the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers and by the general secretary of the CCP Central Committee, Hu Yaobang, PRC President Li Xiannian, and the chairman of the PRC State Council, Zhao Ziyang, to Romanian

party and state chief Ceausescu and the Romanian prime minister, Constantin Dascalescu on the occasion of the 39th anniversary of the "Romania's liberation from the fascist yoke" (Soviet version) and the 39th anniversary of "Romania's national holiday" (PRC version) on 23 August 1983. First of all, it is conspicuous that on the Soviet side only institutions congratulated the Romanian politicians, whereas Beijing, to underscore its close relations to Bucharest, in each case had the highest officeholder sign the message of greeting.

The Soviet congratulators in their message point out that on 23 August 1944 "Romania's patriotic forces" led by the communists "under the conditions of the decisive victory of the Soviet Union in World War II and the destruction of the fascist troops by the Soviet army ... carried out the armed uprising." The "new Romania" accordingly was able to count on the "manysided support from the USSR and other fraternal countries." Bucharest is also again being reminded that "the Soviet Union consistently" develops "its relations to the Socialist Republic of Romania on the unshakable principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism" (i.e., Soviet hegemony—D.G.). Finally, the "special importance" is being underscored that befits "the unity and cohesion of the fraternal countries as well as their close cooperation in international questions."

Basically different is the tenor of the Chinese message of greeting that--by the way was published side by side with the Soviet telegram by the Romanian press. Beijing, without going into detail concerning "Romania's liberation," emphasized that "the heroic Romanian people...under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party headed by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu...has consistently" carried out "an independent, autonomous policy" and has "resolutely advanced on the road of socialism." Moreover, Beijing stresses the "deep revolutionary friendship and fighting solidarity" which link the two communist parties and states as well as the Chinese and Romanian peoples.¹

At the beginning of the eighties, the PRC was the communist country immediately after the Soviet Union with which Bucharest maintained the closest contacts and, aside from Yugoslavia, the friendliest contacts, whereby it does seem that these contacts were less productive for Romania than during the Mao Tsedung era. It was striking that especially the Romanians pressed Beijing while the Chinese were rather reserved as regards return visits. But even Romanian delegations of lesser importance, such as, for example, a delegation of the Front for Socialist Democracy and Unity², a representation of the Romanian-PRC Friendship Society³, a delegation of lower rank RCP functionaries⁴, etc were received in some cases by high-ranking CCP functionaries.

However, neither summit diplomacy nor high-level contacts were neglected. In the fall of 1980, Prime Minister Ilie Verdet was received by the strongman of the PRC regime, Deng Xiaoping as well as by CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng⁵, whose star was already in the process of setting at that time. In the summer of 1981, Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei paid an "official friendship visit" to Beijing and conferred with Deng Xiaoping. He was accompanied by Ion Stoian, deputy minister for foreign trade and international cooperation, among others.⁶ Just as on the occasion of the routine conference of the mixed Romanian-PRC economic commission of 16-24 November 1981⁷, Andrei and Stoian seem to have been politely rebuffed in their attempts to convince the PRC of the necessity of more substantial

assistance to Romania. The pragmatists now ruling in the PRC, regardless of their unchanged sympathy for Bucharest's striving for autonomy, calculate more sharply than the dogmatist Mao Tse Tung.

Early 1982 Foreign Trade Minister Cornel Burtica stayed in Bucharest [as printed] and signed a trade protocol following negotiations with State Council Chairman Zhao Ziyang, the PRC minister for electric energy, and Central Committee Chairman Hu Yaobang.⁸ A few weeks later First Deputy Prime Minister Dinca, on his way to Pyonyang, paid a brief visit to Beijing.⁹ Dinca is likely to have contributed to the preparations for Ceausescu's already announced visit to the PRC.

Ceausescu stayed in the PRC from 12 to 17 April 1982. He was cordially received by his hosts and the Romanian media underscored that he conferred "with old friends." "Expansion of bilateral relations" was cited as the main goal of this visit. In view of the fact that guest and host refrained from issuing a joint communique, it could be concluded that the Romanian party and state chief, too, did not achieve any success in Beijing.¹⁰

Paul Niculescu, the member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee also conducted negotiations with the PRC foreign trade minister.¹¹ Dumitru Popescu, member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee responsible for cultural policy and ideology, was the latest prominent RCP functionary to visit Beijing.¹² In July 1983, Romanian top functionaries of the foreign trade bank visited the PRC.¹³

During the same time, Bucharest had the following return visits in Romania: In December 1980, Ceausescu received a delegation of the "All-Chinese Trade Union Federation";¹⁴ three months later, the PRC foreign trade minister visited Ceausescu.¹⁵ Also a delegation of second and third level CCP functionaries was received by the Romanian party and state chief¹⁶, evidence of the fact that Bucharest was not especially choosy in cultivating its relations with Beijing. Not until May 1982, five weeks after Ceausescu's PRC visit, did a member of the CCP Politburo come to Bucharest to conduct negotiations with the Romanian party head.¹⁷ At the end of 1982 and in 1983, Ceausescu repeatedly met with Chinese top functionaries in Moscow and Bucharest, respectively. On the occasion of the funeral ceremonies for Leonid Brezhnev, he conducted detailed talks in the Soviet capital with PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua who was removed from office soon thereafter.¹⁸ Hua's successor visited Ceausescu in February 1983.¹⁹ And finally in May 1983, Central Committee Chairman Hu Yaobang also visited Bucharest. The PRC top functionary remained in Romania for several days.²⁰

Romania's Relationship With Yugoslavia

Relations between Bucharest and Belgrade were very cordial also at the beginning of the eighties even though the autocrat Ceausescu obviously had difficulties getting used to the collective leadership of the neighboring country. Until the end of September 1983, there were several summit conferences or high-level meetings at which, as expected, the Madrid CSCE Follow-up Conference, the Balkan problem, and primarily economic questions were in the center of attention. On the occasion of his state visit to Yugoslavia in the fall of 1980, Ceausescu emphatically stressed the "exemplary good neighborly relations of friendship and

cooperation between the RCP and the LCY," a formulation that among the Warsaw Pact states for years has only been accorded to Bulgaria. At this meeting it was agreed "to continue the practice of summit conferences," whereby it became clear through some unsureness in his statements that Ceausescu would have preferred a specific person as negotiating partner rather than a functionary holding the top position by rotation. In the foreground on this occasion were economic problems, no surprise since both countries exhibit similar crisis symptoms.²¹

At the end of 1980 Ceausescu met with Central Committee Presidium member Alexandar Glickov in Bucharest. According to the communique, the same questions were dealt with as during Ceausescu's visit to Yugoslavia.²² Ceausescu's negotiations with Presidium chairman Cvijetin Mijatovic and Presidium member Stane Dolanc in February 1981 also proceeded along similar lines.²³ Prime Minister Ilie Verdet again conducted extended economic negotiations during his visit to Yugoslavia in March 1981. During his meeting with Cvijetin Mijatovic, expansion of bilateral relations and worldwide cooperation of both states and parties were routinely agreed to.²⁴

A clear indication of Bucharest's close contacts with Belgrade on a military level was supplied by the visits of Yugoslavia's Federal Secretary for National Defense Nicola Ljubicic to Bucharest²⁵ and of Romanian Defense Minister Lt Gen Constantin Olteanu to Belgrade.²⁶ Both had talks with the top functionary in the respective host country. At these meetings, especially "the importance of closer relations between the two armed forces" and the necessity of establishing a "durable security system in Europe" were underscored.

Further important contacts were the visit by Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei to Belgrade²⁷, the meeting of the Yugoslav Presidium member Sergej Kraigher with Ceausescu in Bucharest²⁸, a further meeting with his successor a few months later, early 1982²⁹, and further contacts with or between the top functionaries of both countries. The relations were manysided and demonstratively cooperative. Especially frequent were the meetings of the foreign and foreign-trade ministers with one another or with the party chief of the neighboring country.

Bucharest's Relations With the Other Nonaligned Communist States

Romania's contacts with Albania at the beginning of the eighties were as rare as in the seventies. Although there have never been any grievances between Bucharest and Tirana of the kind that exist between Tirana and Moscow or attacks as those between Tirana and Beijing following improvements of the relations of the PRC with the United States, the relations between the RCP and the AWP were as aloof as imaginable. Once, at the end of 1981, it seemed that the two countries again wanted to come closer at least on an economic level. Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Cornel Burtica, dismissed half a year later for corruption, visited the Albanian prime minister shortly before the latter's mysterious suicide. Even though the trade is hardly significant, both politicians expressed "satisfaction over the economic development." The fact that at this meeting agreement was also reached regarding the principles of independence, equality of all states, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries³⁰ did not cause the least bit of surprise in view of the identical rejection of the Soviet claims to hegemony.

At the beginning of the eighties, Bucharest maintained especially contacts on an economic level to Cuba, whereby it is noteworthy that Romania considers the communist island republic as a potentially expanding sales market for its industrial products and its technical knowhow. Of course, Bucharest incidentally was trying to meet protocol practices between ideologically related regimes. For example, at the end of 1980 the RCP was represented at the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba by Dumitru Popescu, member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee.³¹ Havana reciprocated for this gesture with the visit by Flavio Bravo Pardo, Cuban deputy prime minister, to Ceausescu.³² No agreements of any consequence appear to have been reached in any of these cases.

Nicolae Constantin, chairman of the state planning committee, conducted economic negotiations in Havana, whereby he was also received by party chief Fidel Castro.³³ Contacts with economic emphasis intensified in 1983. Ion Avram, minister of machine building, negotiated in Havana with the Cuban ministers for the basic materials industry, the metallurgical industry and machine building, and for foreign trade. In this connection, a program was set up "for the development of cooperation in the production of motors, motor vehicles, rail vehicles, agricultural machinery during 1983-1990."³⁴ A mixed government commission met in Havana in July 1983.³⁵ Gheorghe Radulescu, member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee, was received by Fidel Castro during the same month.³⁶

Romania's relations with North Korea were close. In October 1980, the then Prime Minister Ilie Verdet stayed in Pyongyang for a whole week on the occasion of the Sixth Party Congress of the North Korean communist party. In his speech, Verdet advocated "respecting the right of every individual party to develop by itself its political line as well as revolutionary strategy and tactics." Immediately prior to his return to Romania, the Romanian guest met with the North Korean Communist party chief Kim Il-song.³⁷

Subsequently Kim Il-song received in addition to important Romanian guests also some less important ones. Of interest to both sides was undoubtedly the visit by Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei who transmitted Ceausescu's wish to the North Korean Central Committee general secretary and president for Korea to be a "united, independent, democratic, and prosperous fatherland" for all Koreans as soon as possible. Andrei described the relations between Bucharest and Pyongyang as "exemplary."³⁸

Of lesser importance are likely to have been the talks of Kim Il-song with a delegation of editors of the Romanian central organ SCINTEIA³⁹ and with the member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee Cornelia Filipas, co-chairman of the "Consultative Romanian-Korean Government Commission."⁴⁰ Ceausescu, too, is likely to have obtained few new findings from his meeting with representatives of the North Korean youth organization.⁴¹ However, his talks with Kim Yong Nam⁴², the Korean Central Committee secretary, and Central Committee Presidium member Kim Il⁴³ are to be rated on a higher level. Ceausescu himself made a friendship visit to his colleague Kim Il-song on 17-24 April 1982.⁴⁴

The reason why Ceausescu demonstratively maintains cool relations with Vietnam was provided by him in an interview at the end of 1980, which he granted to a Swedish newspaper. In it he stated:

"We are of the opinion that...everything must be done to solve problems by means of political negotiations. Foreign troops must be removed from the territories of other states and the rights of every people to solve its problems independently must be respected. We are of the opinion that everything must be done so that the people of Kampuchea will be able to implement its national reconciliation and the re-organization of its life in a democratic manner, without any outside interference."⁴⁵

These plain words and some later allusions to Vietnam's expansionist and hegemonial policy in Southeast Asia, which, of course, were expressed with a glance at the political ideas of the USSR, caused Hanoi to keep its distance from Bucharest. At the beginning of the eighties, a single relatively significant Romanian-Vietnamese meeting took place: Vietnam's foreign minister visited Ceausescu in the summer of 1981⁴⁶, which, however, did not lead to any rapprochement of the points of view of both countries.

Bucharest's Relations With the African 'People's Democracies' and Communist Parties

In the period dealt with here, Bucharest was obviously striving to represent its special ideological aspects also to its African friends despite far-reaching agreement with its allies in the fundamental questions. The Romanian press has repeatedly attacked South Africa on account of its apartheid policy and on account of the "colonialist and imperialist policy." In the summer of 1981, the official Romanian news agency, on behalf of the government, officially opposed the South African attacks against Angola because of the support which this country grants to the SWAPO Namibian "liberation movement": "The Romanian public strongly condemns the South African attacks against Angola."⁴⁷ However, the contacts between Bucharest and Luanda were hardly worth mentioning. In the summer of 1982, an MPLA delegation visited Ceausescu.⁴⁸ The SWAPO chairman operating from Angola also visited Ceausescu once. On this occasion, the two politicians underscored "their concern over the situation in South Africa" and underscored the "right of the Namibian people to live a life in complete independence and sovereignty."⁴⁹

The contacts to the People's Republic of the Congo were closer. In late 1980 Ceausescu received the Congolese education minister⁵⁰, early 1981 a delegation of deputies.⁵¹ In the fall of 1982, the Congolese trade minister visited Ceausescu.⁵² Ioan Florea, the Romanian forestry minister, on his part paid a visit to Congo and there was received by the chairman of the Congolese (Unity) Party of Labor, Denis Sassou Nguesso.⁵³

Relatively numerous were also Bucharest's contacts with Mozambique, which in view of its economic problems is trying to improve its relations with the Western world. The visit by the vice-governor of the Bank of Mozambique to Ceausescu in August 1980 already indicated a strengthening of the relations between the two

countries.⁵⁴ In the eyes of the leftist socialist president Samora Machel, Romania offers the advantage, as compared to all other Warsaw Pact states, that it pursues a national nonaligned policy. In recent years there have been repeated indications that Mozambique rejects dependence on the Moscow-centered communist world in the manner in which Angola must tolerate it.

In September 1980, Samora Machel himself visited Bucharest for several days. He was accompanied by numerous experts from nearly all fields of politics and economics; between 13 and 17 September they conferred at length with their Romanian colleagues. The detailed joint declaration by Ceausescu and Machel indicated that, in addition to the obligatory "bilateral problems," "joint action within the UN, Group 77, and the Nonaligned States Organization: was in the center of the talks."⁵⁵

In April 1981, Ceausescu received the minister-governor of the Bank of Mozambique.⁵⁶ A high military delegation from Mozambique visited Ceausescu in September 1982.⁵⁷ In March 1983 a joint economic conference was held in Maputo.⁵⁸ Early May 1982, Mihai Ghere, the member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee, handed a message of greeting from Ceausescu to Machel, whereby he probably discussed the program of the coming visit by the Romanian party and state chief with his host.⁵⁹ Ceausescu paid an official visit to Mozambique in July 1983. According to the joint declaration of the party and state chiefs, the meeting took place "in a cordial atmosphere."⁶⁰

During the early part of the eighties, Romania had no higher-level contacts with Ethiopia. It was not until June 1983 that Ceausescu's son Nicu paid a courtesy visit to the Ethiopian foreign minister.⁶¹ On this occasion, Nicu Ceausescu, secretary of the Communist Youth League, probably arranged the details of the coming visit by his father to Addis Ababa. The latter stayed in the Ethiopian capital on 12-14 July 1983. According to the communique, the meeting with state chief Mengistu Haile Mariam took place in "a cordial atmosphere."⁶²

Contacts With the Communist Parties of Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America (With the Exception of the "Eurocommunists")

At the beginning of the eighties, Romania continued its tradition of giving preference to interstate relations over interparty contacts. Accordingly there were relatively few high-level meetings between Romanian and foreign communist top functionaries.

The Communist Party of Belgium twice dispatched members of its Politburo to Bucharest: early 1981, Ceausescu received Jan Debrouwere⁶³, in April 1982 Jaques Nagels.⁶⁴ The 1981 meeting was the more interesting of the two: the two politicians expressed the hope that Poland by itself, without any foreign (Soviet--D. G.) help would overcome its crisis.

In early 1981, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee came from Finland⁶⁵, at the end of September 1982 the chairman of the Finnish Communist Party.⁶⁶ In the case of Greece, the RCP gave preference to the Moscow-critical splinter party, Communist Party of Greece--Internal, as in the seventies. Petre Lupu, member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee,

represented the RCP at the third party Congress of this organization.⁶⁷ The Central Committee secretary of this splinter party was received by Ceausescu in September 1982.⁶⁸ Florakis, the general secretary of the more important pro-Moscow Greek Communist Party, visited Ceausescu in May 1983.⁶⁹

The RCP contacts with the Moscow-critical British Communist Party were also sporadic. Early October 1980, Dumitru Popescu, member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee and Central Committee secretary, met with Gordon McLennan, general secretary of the British Communist Party. The two communist party secretaries agreed among other things that "the communist and international workers movement" must strengthen "its unity on the basis of equality and independence of each party."⁷⁰ A year later almost to the day, Ion Coman, member of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee, held talks with Gordon McLennan in London.⁷¹

The RCP had only one single contact with the Dutch communist party at the beginning of the eighties: The chairman of the "Party of Labor" visited Ceausescu in May 1983.⁷² The meetings with the Austrian Communist Party chief Franz Muhri were more numerous. Muhri visited Ceausescu in early 1981.⁷³ The results of these talks appear to have been just as unproductive as those aimed for at a meeting of the two party chiefs on the occasion of Ceausescu's state visit to Vienna 6 months later.⁷⁴ In October 1981 a meeting took place in Vienna between Ion Ursu, chairman of the National Council for Science and Technology, with Hertha Firnberg, Austrian minister for science and research. This meeting was centered on the question of diversification and cooperation of the two countries in the fields of chemistry, metallurgy, energy, machine building, and public health.⁷⁵ In June 1983, Iosif Banc handed over Ceausescu's message of greeting to Franz Muhri.⁷⁶

The RCP contacts with the KPD were not particularly intensive at the beginning of the eighties. However, the SEW (West Berlin communist party) was interested in establishing contact with Ceausescu. In his talk with the Berlin communist party, Ceausescu emphasized the right of all communist parties to equality.⁷⁷ A meeting between Dumitru Popescu and SEW chairman Horst Schmitt took place in early 1983.

There were two contacts with Portugal's communist party: In May 1981 the communist party chief of Portugal visited Ceausescu; it seems the two politicians did not have much to say to one another;⁷⁸ at the end of August 1982, Ceausescu received a group of Portuguese communist party functionaries.⁷⁹ Umberto Barulli, the general secretary of San Marino's communist party, also visited Ceausescu a few times.⁸⁰ Lars Werner, the chairman of the Swedish communist party, even visited Ceausescu twice.⁸¹

The contacts with the Latin American communist parties mostly had protocol character. In September 1981, Ceausescu was visited by the general secretary of the Argentine communist party, Athos Fava.⁸² In September 1980, the general secretary of the Chilean communist party, Luis Corvalan, paid a visit to Ceausescu.⁸³ The visit of the general secretary of the Communist Party of Santo Domingo, Narxiso Isa Conde took place two years later.⁸⁴ A communist party

delegation from Ecuador visited Ceausescu in April 1982.⁸⁵ The general secretary of the Communist Party of Guadeloupe had two talks with Ceausescu during his Romania visit.⁸⁶ The relations of the RCP with the communist party of Mexico were closer. The Central Committee general secretary of the Mexican communist party, Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, visited Ceausescu twice: in August 1980 and in April 1983.⁸⁷ The main topics of the talks were the international situation and developments in Latin America. In 1981, Ceausescu's son Nicu paid a visit to Verdugo.⁸⁸ And finally Ceausescu also met with the chief of the Party of the American Revolutionary People's Alliance of Peru⁸⁹ and with the general secretary of the Communist Party of Uruguay, Rodney Arismendi.⁹⁰ These meetings, too, were only formal in character.

There has been one single contact between the RCP and the Communist Party of India during the period being studied: a delegation of the Indian communist party was received by Ceausescu in October 1982.⁹¹ On the other hand, two high Japanese Communist Party functionaries visited Ceausescu: Politburo member Shinitshi Takahara in August 1980 and the deputy Presidium member of the Japanese Communist Party in September 1982.⁹² There was a single contact with the Communist Party of Australia: The national secretary of this communist party visited Ceausescu in March 1982.⁹³ On the other hand, the RCP relations with the Communist Party of Mauritius became very close as in the seventies. The chairman of the communist party of the small island republic, an old confidant of the Romanian party head, visited Ceausescu in September 1980, May 1981, and April 1982. The tenor of all these relations was: abolishing the policy of dominance and dictation, "democratization of the international relations," promotion of the detente policy, "noninterference in the affairs of other states and parties," etc.⁹⁴, all topics dear to the hearts of both parties. The Communist Party of Mauritius has categorically rejected Moscow's hegemony claims for years.

FOOTNOTES

1. SCINTEIA, 25 Aug 83.
2. Ibid., 7 Oct 80.
3. Ibid., 3 Oct 81.
4. Ibid., 22 Dec 81.
5. Ibid., 7 Oct 80 and 28 Nov 80.
6. Ibid., 16 and 18 Jun 81.
7. Ibid., 26 Nov 81.
8. Ibid., 24 and 25 Feb 82.
9. Ibid., 7 Sep 82.

10. Ibid., 12-18 Apr 82.
11. Ibid., 3 Oct 82.
12. Ibid., 30 Jun 83.
13. Ibid., 13 Jul 83.
14. Ibid., 12 Dec 80.
15. Ibid., 19 May 81.
16. Ibid., 23 Oct 81.
17. Ibid., 28 May 82.
18. Ibid., 14 Nov 82.
19. Ibid., 10 Feb 83.
20. Ibid., 6-11 May 83.
21. Ibid., 25 Oct 82.
22. Ibid., 13 Dec 80.
23. Ibid., 2 and 3 Feb 81.
24. Ibid., 23 Apr 80.
25. Ibid., 11 Jul 81.
26. Ibid., 3 Feb 82.
27. Ibid., 16 Sep 81.
28. Ibid., 10 Nov 81.
29. Ibid., 20 Feb 82.
30. Ibid., 19 Aug 82.
31. Ibid., 22 Dec 80
32. Ibid., 31 Oct 81.
33. Ibid., 28 Jan 81.
34. Ibid., 16 Mar 83.
35. Ibid., 19 Jul 83.

36. Ibid., 30 Jul 83.
37. Ibid., 13 and 18 Oct 80.
38. Ibid., 24 Jun 81.
39. Ibid., 19 Dec 81.
40. Ibid., 26 Mar 82.
41. Ibid., 2 Feb 82.
42. Ibid., 17 Jul 82.
43. Ibid., 20 Aug 82.
44. Ibid., 17-25 Apr 82.
45. SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 5 Nov 80.
46. SCINTEIA, 2 Jul 81.
47. AGERPRES, 28 Aug 81.
48. SCINTEIA, 6 Jul 82.
49. Ibid., 7 Mar 81
50. Ibid., 28 Nov 80.
51. Ibid., 28 Jan 81.
52. Ibid., 28 Sep 82.
53. Ibid., 18 Aug 83.
54. Ibid., 22 Aug 80.
55. Ibid., 18 Sep 80.
56. Ibid., 30 Apr 81.
57. Ibid., 17 Sep 82.
58. Ibid., 19 Mar 83.
59. Ibid., 4 May 83.
60. Ibid., 21 Jul 83.
61. Ibid., 22 Jun 83.

62. Ibid., 15 Jul 83.
63. Ibid., 9 Jan 81.
64. Ibid., 4 Dec 82.
65. Ibid., 31 Jan 82.
66. Ibid., 29 Sep 82.
67. Ibid., 20 May 82.
68. Ibid., 21 Sep 82.
69. Ibid., 15 May 83.
70. Ibid., 4 Oct 80.
71. Ibid., 3 Oct 81.
72. Ibid., 7 May 83.
73. Ibid., 7 Jan 81.
74. Ibid., 13 Jun 81.
75. Ibid., 31 Oct 81.
76. Ibid., 2 Jun 83.
77. Ibid., 27 Nov 81.
78. Ibid., 12 and 13 May 81.
79. Ibid., 27 Aug 82.
80. Ibid., 2 Sep 81.
81. Ibid., 24 Jan 8 and 18 Jun 83.
82. Ibid., 2 Sep 81.
83. Ibid., 12 Sep 80.
84. Ibid., 9 Sep 82.
85. Ibid., 29 Apr 82.
86. Ibid., 28 Sep and 5 Oct 82.
87. Ibid., 22 Aug 80 and 20 Apr 83.

- 88. Ibid., 9 Oct 81.
- 89. Ibid., 16 Oct 82.
- 90. Ibid., 14 Oct 81.
- 91. Ibid., 29 Oct 82.
- 92. Ibid., 22 Aug 80 and 17 Sep 82.
- 93. Ibid., 23 Mar 82.
- 94. Ibid., 29 Nov 80, 15 May 81, and 9 Apr 82.

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'CONTRADICTIONS' OF PROTESTANT REFORMATION DISCUSSED

Bucharest SCINTEIA TINERETULUI in Romanian 24 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Gh Al Cazan: "Contradictions of the Reformation"]

[Text] Martin Luther, a man whose ideas and actions were to have a considerable influence on the history of Germany and mankind, was born in 1483 at Eisleben in Thuringia. With a very sensitive temperament, at the age of 22, as a result of a powerful experience in a violent storm, Martin Luther by his own statement entered the Augustine monastery in Erfurt, where he had occasion to study in detail monastic life with all its customs and rankings, after which, in his zeal for study, he was to devote himself to the task of extending the philosophy of Saint Augustine.

The conclusion he reached on the basis of his own observations and following studies to which he applied uncommon energy and passion was that a number of practices zealously kept up by the Catholic Church (fasting, prayers to icons or statues of saints, vigils, confession to priests, donations to the Church and to saints) constituted a barrier between God and man. It was to cause many upheavals in the political life of Germany and many other countries (France, Spain, England, etc) in relations between the state and the church, which was also drawn into large-scale social movements such as the peasant uprising led by Thomas Muentzer.

This was so because the criticism of church rituals alluded to above represented criticism in religious disguise of some of the most important aspects of feudalism and was thus an expression of the interests of the classes and social groups which tacitly came into conflict with feudal realities.

In expressing the idea that the rituals of the Catholic Church prevent communion between man and God, Martin Luther stressed the fact that the Church, with its entire procession of practices (mysteries, services, and so forth), could no longer be considered to be a mediator between man and God, this leading to the idea of the need for doing away with the Church as an organized institution with a hierarchical structure, with an interest as a large feudal power not so much in the so-called "salvation of souls" as in its income. Since there should be no mediator between man and God, thought Martin Luther, but rather since man attains to salvation only by

faith in the grace of God, it follows that every man can and should himself be a teacher, confessor, and savior.

Martin Luther put faith in every human being, believing that every man can save himself through his own power. As Marx observed, he transformed every man into a priest, but this religious form, and even the content of his religious conception in reality cloaked an idea revolutionary for the times in which Luther lived.

His vision of the possibility of man being his own saviour, of saving himself through faith, a religious vision which intensified faith and reasserted the existence of God, was leading and did lead to shattering the dogmatic basis of the Church, and thus to an open, acute, irreversible conflict with the official church, and above all with the papacy. Luther drew up his celebrated 95 theses on repentance, which, once printed, became the battle standard of the petty nobility and the burghers (townsmen) and of some great nobles and princes even against the dominance of the Church, at the same time inaugurating the Reformation and its spirit, which was quickly to suffuse all of Europe.

Although he admits the existence of original sin and the ideas of salvation of man by faith, in this mystic form he caught a glimpse of the idea which the bourgeoisie was to use in its struggle against feudalism, that of the equality of men and their right to be their own masters, to act on their behalf to provide for their existence.

Expressing, in the words of Engels, "the most radical currents" and seeking to unite all opposition elements, Luther in 1517 "had to give proof of the most resolute revolutionary energy," opposing Catholic bigotry with "the whole corpus of previously existing heresies" (Friedrich Engels). "If their mad fury" (that of the priests) "continues to be manifested in the future," wrote Luther, "it seems to me that there is no better means to curb it than for kings and princes to use force, to arm themselves and attack these noxious men who are poisoning the world and put an end to this affair once and for all, with arms and not with words."

Resolutely denying the role of mediator between man and God which the Church has arrogated to itself and denouncing the Church as despoiler of the fortunes of men and of their sentiments, Luther held that the only authority in the matter of religious belief is the Bible. In his works he proposed emancipation of the state from the authority of Rome, abolition of the paid theses of the Pope, and establishment of a national German church. The Pope excommunicated him, but Luther won over the German people. On being asked by the lay authority and the Papal nuncio to retract his opinions, a practice in which the Church was accomplished, Luther replied, "I will retract and can retract nothing, for it is not proper and not honest to speak against conscience." This maxim made him illustrious and at the same time places him in the number of men aware of the meaning of their work and their life. As is to be seen from the ideas which he developed, he set in opposition to the Church the right of the individual conscience to decide for itself; he set man against the same authority.

His view of predestination, although mystic in nature, in its turn contained the idea of struggle against militant asceticism and opened up new horizons for action. This moved some of the interpreters of protestantism (among them Max Weber) to see in this trend, exaggeratedly of course, one of the causes of development of capitalist production relations.

Moreover, as regards his theses presaging reassumption of the power of man by man, which admittedly are couched in religious terms and thus are to be explained by the contradictions of that age in history, we are witness today to a situation in which they have been taken over and mysticized by certain neoprotestant sects.

During the peasant war in Germany Luther evinced a lack of understanding of the struggle of the peasantry against exploitation. Although his teachings "fully succeeded" (in the words of Engels) in setting the entire German people in movement, when the peasants saw in his "appeals against the priests and in his sermons on Christian liberty a signal to revolt" (Engels). When they revolted Luther restrained them, urging passive resistance. Moreover, being considered, as he indeed was, an official representative of the burghers reform, a moderate reform, Luther urged violent repression of the peasant movement.

A contradictory personality, in his way Luther prepared the way for the struggle against the Church and the papacy, contributed to raising the masses up against feudalism, and to formation and development of the German literary language, but at the same time failed to understand perhaps the most significant event in sixteenth century Germany, the peasant uprising.

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DANGERS OF ESCALATION OF ARMS RACE STRESSED

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 23, 10 Dec 83 pp 10-14

[Article by Vasile Secares; "The Policy of Force and Escalation of the Nuclear Arms Race - A Serious Threat to World Peace and Security"]

[Text] No matter how little we would want to make such a finding, it is nonetheless clear that from the end of the 1970's we are seeing a serious deterioration of the international climate, and accentuation of tensions and a sharpening of confrontations between different states and groups of states. As was noted in the report presented to the National RCP Conference in December 1982, in recent years there has been an increase in the expressions of the policy of force and of interfering in the affairs of other states, there have been new military conflicts and there has been an intensification of the arms race and an increase in the danger of war, including a nuclear world war.¹

The aberrant escalation of the arms race, with its current stage being especially dangerous - the move to install new nuclear missiles in Europe -, obviously expresses the exacerbated carrying out of the policy of force, of domination of the world and of redividing spheres and regions of influence. The placement of new nuclear missiles in a number of countries in Europe represents a clear violation of the treaty dealing with the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and is of a nature to also more powerfully undermine international security and increase the danger of a nuclear war. "The statements that the installation of new nuclear missiles serves peace and will speed up nuclear disarmament actually attempt," as comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out, "to hide reality, to quiet and deflect the people's attention away from the great danger represented by the new missiles. The people must be openly and honestly told the truth! The new missiles do not serve and cannot serve peace! On the contrary, they will considerably increase the danger of nuclear war and nuclear catastrophe!"²

Under these conditions, when the international situation has been aggravated to a previously unattained level, bringing mankind to the threshold of nuclear war, the destroyer of life on earth, it is an absolute necessity for the people and the progressive, realistic and peace-loving forces to strongly and consistently work in order to stop the escalation of the nuclear missile arms race in Europe and the continued aggravation of the international situation. As on other occasions, Romania has once again stated its position of defending peace and security in Europe and in the entire world,

A new and clear expression of the policy of peace firmly and consistently promoted by our country and by president Nicolae Ceausescu is the recent initiatives and proposals made by our country and comrade Nicolae Ceausescu for disarmament and peace.

These important initiatives and proposals contained in comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's speech given on the 65th anniversary of the creation of unified Romanian national state, in his speech at the November session of the Grand National Assembly, in the Declaration of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP Central Committee, the Council of State and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, as well as in other party and state documents, have a broad reverberation in contemporary international affairs and constitute a passionate appeal to reason and to responsible and firm political actions for the defense of the supreme right of people, the right of the people to life and to existence.

Beginning with the especially serious events that have occurred in recent times on the European continent and which have opened the path for the intensification of the atomic race and the increase of the danger of war and a nuclear catastrophe, our party and state stress the imperative need in this situation for the governments and responsible authorities in all countries and all peoples themselves to work without delay to safeguard peace and to remove the danger which threatens Europe and the entire planet. Through the words of the president of Romania, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, our country is addressing a vibrant call to all countries and peoples to do everything in order to arrive at understandings that will lead to stopping the nuclear arms race on our continent, to stopping the placement of new intermediate range missiles, to withdrawing and destroying the existing ones, and to freeing Europe and the entire world from any type of nuclear weapon. The proposals and initiatives made by Romania and its president, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, are a shining contribution to the cause of the peace and security of Europeans and the entire world and to the affirmation of the policy of peace, detente and cooperation.

Without a doubt, no one expects the current rebasing of international economic, political and military relations to be carried out "quietly" without any difficulties. Despite this, the deterioration of the world situation during the current period calls for a broader explanation. At the same time, it is also proving to be the effect and the component of any especially complex process which, in order to be appropriately characterized, must be analyzed in connection with certain data defining the transformations which affect the structure of power on the international level.

First of all, we have in mind the specific relationship of forces in the context of which we see the carrying out of the elimination of the old system generated by the capitalist system and imperialist policy. Certainly, important changes have taken place in the world, but the old balance is discussed in many regards, concomitantly with the gradually affirmation of a new international balance, a new relationship of forces in the world arena. One should not, however, draw from this the conclusion of an already absolute preponderance of forces that have come out for the structural renovation of the existing economic, political and

military framework and for the building of a new international economic and political system.

Second, it is not difficult to see that the transformation of the international system involves a confrontation that rejects any type of description in black and white and in terms of a strictly determined polar relationship. The trends that are in opposition are diverse, as well as the forces that are involved, while the "front" lines and the "trenches" of the confrontation are far from following distinct paths and/or parallels. This variety is expressed in the reasons which animate "the actors" involved in the struggle and the goals that are pursued, depending upon what is under consideration from the structure of the old system.

Third, it is necessary for us to bring into the discussion the manner in which the old framework of relations is being overcome. Without a doubt, this change cannot be considered but a positive, liberating process. At the same time, in our opinion, the evolution towards a new international economic and political order, which involves the gradual affirmation of certain new relationships between nations and states, is also characterized during the current stage by the internal destruction of the previous system.³ It is marked, therefore, by a succession of breaks and collisions which contribute to an increase in instability and involve serious uncertainties with regards to the unfolding of events.

Finally - but not lastly - it is necessary for us to correlate the worsening of the international situation with a recrudescence of the resorting to force and the threats of force, of imperialist policies of force and diktat, of an arms race, primarily a nuclear one, of a redivision of the world into spheres of influence, and of interference in the affairs of other states. An analysis of the evolution of the situation at the international level over the last decade shows that since the second half of the 1970's, in this regard the material elements of a new stage have appeared. We are talking about the amplification of expressions - political, economic and military ones - which have been showing and continue to show a counter-reaction by the states and groups of states interested in maintaining, consolidating and "adapting" to the new conditions of a world system based upon inequality, domination and exploitation and upon the supremacy of certain great powers and rich countries. This counter-reaction is defined, in its fundamental sense, as a policy of force and especially as a policy based upon the resources of the armed forces.

Certainly, today we are confronted in international affairs with relatively varied types of uses and manipulations of armed forces - with regards to both the forms of expression and the objectives pursued, something which is explained by the complexity itself of the belligerent processes specific to the contemporary world. Furthermore, we could even speak of a tendency for the multiplication of this type of activities and a broadening of the circle of participants in military confrontations - real or potential confrontations.

The current or foreseeable level of a resort to force must, thus, be analyzed in connection with the overall group of contradictions which currently mark relations between states and in connection with all the economic, political

and ideological restructurings that are taking place in the world and, similarly, with all the evolutions that have occurred and are occurring in the military world and in the area of the balance of forces and the opportunities for the use of military resources.

At the same time, it is necessary to stress clearly that the decisive weight in the dialectics of forces and in its current implication in international relations falls to the use of military actions in the interest of conserving the existing outdated system in the world and reaffirming the traditional distribution of power and wealth and relationships of domination. A similar means of dealing with the problem in our opinion begins, in a fully justified manner, with the need to view the system of armed forces as an integral part of social-economic, political, military and ideological systems of our world. On one hand, this allows showing the fact that both the means to which they resort and the opportunity to use their properties have the structure of the world system as a starting point. On the other hand, we are talking about determining the causes for resorting to armed force in the context of the operation of the international system overall and in connection with the concerns for maintaining certain "rules of the game" within their bounds.

In this context, an especially important problem is that of goals and the practical forms in which the policy of force are expressed. When the promoters of the use of military means refer to the reasons which brought about one action of another, they usually resort to invoking certain "security" needs. It is not too difficult to see that things are far from being convincingly described in this area. There is a use of armed force not because these states see their "security" in question, because they are required to counteract different threats to their independence, sovereignty, the values that define their social-political systems or their economic development. In essence, for the powerfully armed countries this is not a question. The reasons that must be taken into consideration have a nature that is especially structural and deal with certain points within their position in the international system.

Specifically, we are talking about the use of arms in order to counteract the political, economic and military evolutions that tend to transform the world balance in a radical manner. The current aggravation of the international climate is based upon efforts that are "convulsive and destabilizing" - as the American analyst W. E. Colby clearly called them - and which attempt to stop the "descending tendencies" that are being expressed with regards to the status of forces - states and groups of states - favored by the old distribution of power.⁴ Furthermore, the politologist B. B. de Mesquita showed the significant correlation of the changes in the distribution of power with the level of use of force (the number of armed confrontations) within the international system (over periods of 5 years). Things become even more clear if we keep in mind the arguments made in numerous studies in favor of the thesis that the probability of the initiation of a war by various great powers

is greater at the points of inflexibility in the curve which describes the cycle of their relative abilities, in essence, their positions in the system.⁵ The secretary general of our party, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu correctly estimated that a fundamental requirement of the current period is that of putting an end "to the policy of great powers, of hegemony and of interference in any form in the internal affairs of small and medium-sized countries."⁶

In stressing these things, we must at the same time state that we have nothing to do with a combined effort by different states and groups of states interested in maintaining the old international order, with competitive actions and a sharp struggle for the consolidation and re-division of spheres of influence. Even in 1978, our party pointed out: "It can be said that after the second world war for the first time we saw a powerful intensification of the struggle for a new division of the world and regions of influence and for acquiring new dominant positions on the part of different countries and groups of countries."⁷

In such a context, the actions involving force appear as moments correlated with confrontations that, in one way or another, cover the entire globe. In the end, they are defined as links in a chain of collisions, as stages or steps in a "horizontal" or "vertical" escalation that is uninterrupted: "gains" or "losses" are never final because there are always possibilities for a set-back or a rebuff in other regions or in other fields. The reasons or goals of different military initiatives are specifically determined at the economic, political and strategic level and on the basis of the realities of the current world geopolitical structure (with an explicit placement in space) and they are subordinated to the same overall goal: that of ruling the world.

In a practical sense, it cannot be said that there is a region of the world where this struggle is not being felt. Without a doubt, there are various "formulas" in the policy of force and diktat and of maintaining and dividing the world into spheres of influence. These differences, however, tend to be in the area of the means put into action and the forms of expressing the use of arms - which can be either direct or indirect.

It is not hard to see that such a confrontation is being powerfully carried out in Europe. The new round of the arms race - linked to the placement, which has begun and is being carried out, of hundreds of intermediate range nuclear missiles - actually defines its significance in connection with the concern for the strengthening of international security or the readdressal of some type of military "imbalance" and, first of all, with certain interests of great power politics and the division of Europe into opposing blocs. The consequences of these actions to over arm are among the most dangerous because, in the final analysis, they open the path of an uncontrollable evolution towards the escalation of the arms race and towards nuclear catastrophe.

As a result, never in its history has mankind been such a grave situation which threatens the existence of life itself on our planet. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in his speech at the festive session dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the creation of the unified Romanian national state: "We have reached such a situation where the stopping of the arms race and the transition to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and the insurance of peace have become the fundamental problems of our epoch."⁸ Everything must be done, stresses the president of our country, in order to cause the nuclear powers to renounce their policies, which are leading to the destruction of the world, not to the defense of peace.

The actions of force are, to a good degree, linked also to the evolutions that have taken place in the developing nations, or more precisely stated they are an expression of the reaction of those states which occupy privileged positions in the system of these evolutions. Neoconservative analysts like D. P. Moynihan and R. W. Tucker were concerned even in 1975 with the significance of the increase in the role of the "Third World" in configuring power at the worldwide level.⁹ Dealing with this problem from the specific perspective of the interests of a great power, W. E. Colby noted in a 1980 study that the "Third World" constituted a "proximal danger" that would confront the power of the United States in the ninth decade.¹⁰

However, what is this all about? From the beginning, we must state that "the danger" has never come from the interests or actions of the developing nations that might hurt the interests or strike at the sovereignty of certain developed countries or great powers. The so-called "danger" that these poor countries represent is, in reality, something else entirely from that which the apologists of force have in mind. The military actions in or against the developing nations are defined only in the context of the competition for regions of influence. Different states that are powerful from an economic and military point of view are interested in maintaining and consolidating their positions in the "Third World": in the control of certain resources, especially petroleum, and the lines of communication and maritime transport; by their presence in certain strategic regions; by political influence in certain important states in the regional or global balance of power (notice the new centers of power). Regions of "maximum concern" - including some that were also directly contained in official political-military strategies - are the Middle East and the Gulf Region, the Caribbean and Central America, and Southeast Asia. The promotion of interests in these regions and in the developing nations in general takes place in practical terms of a struggle between different states and groups of states to maintain, consolidate and extend - all mutually prejudicial - their political, economic and military presence and spheres of domination.

Similarly, we must refer to the placing of actions of the policy of force upon conflictual evolutions - social, political, ethnic and religious - in different developing nations. The current international system maintains the bases for underdevelopment or unequal development on the economic, social and

cultural levels, which strongly accentuates also the possibilities for certain convulsions and social and political confrontations in these countries. Such conflicts are especially sensitive to external manipulation, especially since within the framework of internal struggles for power forces also appear which call upon foreign help. At the same time, the military and political conflicts between different developing nations are evaluated as "plausible" occasions for intervention by certain great powers. In other words, they permit the elaboration of "respectable" reasons (avoidance of certain "uncontrollable events," "maintaining stability" and so forth) for the policy of force.

After studying a group of 40 developing nations, a recognized India researcher, S. Rana, reached the conclusion that in the case of two-thirds of internal conflicts (36 nations) or bilateral conflicts (20 nations) where these nations were involved, the initial crisis was accentuated or broadened as a result of foreign intervention.¹¹ At the same time, let us mention I. Kende's opinion, which statistically showed that the interventionist powers are especially interested in internal confrontations that appeared on the basis of certain social-economic and political changes and/or were linked to the maintenance or elimination of a certain regime.¹²

Actually, we could say that today we are witnessing the expansion of a specific form of armed intervention linked to the imposition, protection or establishment of certain social-political structures within the framework of a "periphery" (structures similar to those of the "exporting" power). In our opinion, the ideological component of the competition for spheres of influence is being ever more accentuated at the current moment, with some political groups attempting to determine the course of development of various countries exclusively through the prism of global and bipolar confrontations and to transform the so-called "border between systems" (defined, however, in a variable manner) into a true "war zone".

The dangerous nature of such an approach is beyond any discussion. It denies the freedom of choice for the people for a course of development that they want, including the appropriate path towards socialism. It is clear, however, that class relations at the worldwide level and the social-economic evolutions in general reject such a treatment on the basis of bloc logic and the interests in distribution or redistribution of regions of domination. It should be just as clear that there can be no talk of a solution to the contradictions between capitalism and socialism and to any type of ideological differences on the basis of armed confrontations. Nothing will be able to stop more and more people from moving to the path of socialist development. And, as the secretary general of our party pointed out, "socialism cannot be exported, it cannot and should not be imposed from the outside... At the same time, there must be a firm rejection of the export of counter-revolution and the external support for reactionary forces in the struggle against their own people. Each nation must decide its own course of social and national development in an independent manner and to create the system that it wants, without any outside interference."¹³ Respect for the diversity of social-economic and political evolution, and the peaceful coexistence of countries having different social systems is an objective necessity in today's world.

An analysis of the status of using armed force cannot be considered complete without our pausing upon the real and continually increasing difficulties confronting military actions in the achievement of the tasks entrusted to them within the framework of imperialist policies. Since, as a fact that has been fully demonstrated by experience, in the world there is an ever more powerful expression of the will of the people to put a final end to the imperialist policies of force and diktat, of dividing the world into spheres of influence, and, instead, of establishing new relations between states that are founded on equality and mutual respect and on respect for national independence and sovereignty. However, is there not a contradiction in this thesis at the current time when we see an intensification of the use of force?

If we take a retrospective look at things, it seems clear that in the last 2 decades there has been an increase in the restraints that are involved in the use of military means in international politics. Even in the view of its promoters, in a series of cases the costs of using force have, gradually, become excessive. It is ever more clearer that in the stage we are passing through the great powers, other states and groups of states cannot resort to the "virtues" of instruments of force whenever, however and in any part of the world, and that certain forms of military restrictions no longer produce results, but certain objectives can no longer be attained by military efforts.

The evolution that took place in the second half of the 1970's shows, however, how contradictory - and even irreversible - this trend is. Actually, if we analyze what happened in recent years in the area of the use of military means, we will noted a gradually "rehabilitation" of the value of military options in the realm of imperialist policy. And, this is not of an abstract nature, but in direct connection with the practical affirmation of convictions that the manipulation of military capabilities can permit the attainment of certain significant political results in general, with an increase in the belief in the "successful" and "legitimate" use of force.

What are the causes and component elements of this course of action? On one hand, we are talking about instability in different regions of the world, especially in some developing nations, which create the pretext and justification for a "fait accompli" response using armed force. The events during this period have thus pointed out can the possessors of these instruments of force who are called to speculate on such situations become unwanted "arbiters" of these regional evolutions. Clearly, the results that are obtained in this regard as a result of having certain appropriate military capabilities have contributed to the spread of the thesis that armed force has a direct role in maintaining or changing political situations (regional or global) in the 1980's and have worked as a stimulant for the development of the necessary instruments and for the elaboration of adequate strategies for their "efficient" use in the future. The escalation of the arms race, and first of all the nuclear arms race, is a clear proof of the expression of such a political course of action.

On the other hand, it is necessary for us to refer to the transformations that have affected the system itself of armed force in the direction of bringing its coercive role to the level of the requirements of the current struggle to maintain the old power structures at the international level, by ensuring certain superior characteristics for these weapons with regards to: a) the ability to strike, b) diversification, c) flexibility and mobility, d) rapidity (getting ahead of the adversary) and so forth. The available data show, in any case, that in the last 10 years some great powers have noticeably increased their absolute military capability, with the level attained greatly exceeding, as the Yugoslav analyst T. Mirkovic stressed, the needs required for their own defense.¹⁴ This course has not been abandoned at the present time. On the contrary, we are seeing the opening of a new round of weapons acquisition carried out under the sign of the obstinate pursuit of military superiority. The move to the placement of new intermediate range missiles in Europe, despite the enormous dangers involved and the clearly stated opposition of the people, is a graphic expression of this trend which brings into discussion the independence and existence itself of the states on the continent.

The development of armed forces has involved all its components, both in the nuclear sphere and in the conventional one. It has as an objective - some results have already been obtained - the elaboration of an organic and coherent system of military means defined by: a) unlocking the coercive potential contained in the nuclear arsenal for the purpose of obtaining an indirect utility from it, and b) reducing the dependency upon atomic weapons and maximizing the possibilities of the "classical" military system. In essence, we are talking about an effort directed towards "the improvement" the perspectives for a common, complementary and flexible manipulation of nuclear and conventional capabilities and the armed forces in general, under the conditions of and on the basis of the existence of weapons of mass destruction and without (further) excluding their eventual use.

In this context, some ruling political circles seem to be moving towards the creation of a new triade: 1) a powerful and credible force to discourage (the strategic nuclear force, necessary "to stabilize" the global balance), 2) the nuclear and conventional "theater" force (especially for the European theater in the case of certain important confrontations) and 3) a "rapid intervention" conventional force for action in the "Third World" (for the purpose of achieving certain specific political-military objectives). We must particularly noted that the quantitative and qualitative development of military capabilities has favored vital components in the plan of building up certain armed forces capable of carrying out various political mission and of carrying out and obtaining the decision on the battlefield in the shortest possible time and at the lowest possible level of activity. Let us merely give one example: on 1 January 1983 in the United States a new "central command" was established that will coordinate a military organization - having 250,000 men available - designed to "safeguard the interests" of this great power "in a region containing 19 countries in the Near East, the Gulf Region and the Indian Ocean."¹⁵

Finally, we must mention the doctrinal re-evaluations regarding the use of armed force. Right from the first half of the 1970's, within the framework of the principal political-military concepts, an attempt was outlined for overcoming "frustrations" and "rigidity" which, according to some estimations, marked this field because of the acceptance of the thesis of the "automatic escalation" of any confrontation under the conditions of the existence of nuclear weapons. Currently, we are seeing the gradual accomplishment of this course of action. Regardless of the traditions which are claimed - "Clausewitzian" or "puritan and liberal" - and regardless of the practical means of dealing with this, the current orientations are characterized by several significant elements. We especially have in mind the adoption of certain concepts and theses that are of a nature of ensuring also a sustained exploitation under the sign of a broad coverage in space (geographic and political) of opportunities that appear in the vulnerable regions of the world: the stress placed on the achievement of surprise; the requirement for a rapidity of actions and the blocking of an adversary's ability to maneuver; the recommendation of offensive operations involving air assault, mobile and in-depth operations; the demonstration of the vital role of certain highly mobile conventional forces that also have a superior maneuver capability, and so forth.

The use of military means in international affairs and the imperialist policy of force in general constitute, today, the main threat to the independence and sovereignty of countries, to the full expression of the people's supreme right - the right to life, to freedom and to peace, and the source of the danger of war which hangs over mankind. And the projected actions - still under the sign of "inevitable" - by certain political groups and some states continue to offer serious reasons to worry. It can be said that this outlines, in the end, a single and imperative conclusion: the concerns and the struggle against the policies of confrontation and war have and must have a central nature.

Never in its long history has mankind been in such a serious situation which threatens the existence of life itself on our planet, points out comrade Nicolae Ceausescu in his speech on the 65th anniversary of the creation of the unified Romanian national state. We have reached such a situation where the stopping of the arms race and the transition to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and assurance of peace have become the fundamental problem of our epoch.¹⁶

Far from contributing in some way to providing security to states or resolving the difficulties facing mankind, the policy of the use of force and the accentuation of the arms race, as an expression of such a policy, continually aggravate the instability of the international situation, accentuate tension and disagreements, and tend to push the world towards a destructive conflagration. As our party and state, as well as president Nicolae Ceausescu, permanently stress, it seems clear that the chances for dealing with and appropriately resolving the complex problems of contemporary evolution and the chances for

certain progressive, democratic transformations in the world along the path towards a new system in the world directly depend upon the provision of a climate in which all peoples will be able to develop in a free and sovereign manner, sheltered from any external aggression, and upon the complete elimination of the use of force and the threat of force from relations between countries and the elimination of armed conflicts.

In the context of a constant concern for the identification of the paths and means for bringing about the desired complete elimination of the system based on force, the policy of diktat and hegemony and the policy of building up arms, our country has outlined in this regard a specific program of action. The gravity of the current situation, stressed the secretary general of the party, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, requires "putting an end completely to the policy of force and diktat," "the policy of regions of influence and interest," and "the policy of great powers, hegemony and interference, in any form, in the internal affairs of small and medium-sized countries."¹⁷ There must be a blocking of the path of all types of expressions of force, creating conditions so that for no reason, in no situation and in no part of the world can there be permitted the use of force and the threat of force or pressures of any type. Similarly, it is necessary to move to the achievement of a stable balance in the world, not through fueling the arms race, but rather through decisive measures that will stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and open the path to the gradual reduction of arsenals and the path to disarmament, and first of all to nuclear disarmament. It is necessary to do everything in order to stop the placement of new missiles in Europe and to move to the destruction of all nuclear weapons, and it is necessary to protect the peace of the world and civilization on the entire planet.

Romania is in favor of the achievement of a unified framework that is as committed as possible to a regulation that will be dedicated to the complete prohibition of the use of force and that will contain the requirement for the solution of any international differences and problems exclusively by peaceful means and negotiations. The ever more powerful development of the movement for disarmament and peace constitutes a factor of the greatest importance in this framework. The conviction that our people share - as powerfully reaffirmed in comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's speech at the festive session dedicated to celebrating the 65th anniversary of the creation of the unified Romanian national state and in the Declaration of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP Central Committee, the Council of State and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania - is that it is within the people's power, through unified and ever more energetic actions, to stop the dangerous evolution of events, to bring about the stopping of the arms race and the move towards practical measures for disarmament, and first of all nuclear disarmament, and to impose the adoption of specific measures that will lead to the elimination of the danger of war and to the safeguarding of peace.

Our country and our people have more than once stated their decision to do everything, together with the other European peoples and countries, to put an end to the ever more threatening arms race, to not have the emplacement of new missiles, to have a withdrawal and destruction of existing missiles, to have the soonest possible resumption of the Soviet-American negotiations on the problem of intermediate range missiles in order to reach and appropriate agreement in this regard and in order to protect the most valuable thing of all mankind - peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report to the National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party, 16-18 December 1982," Politica Publishing House, pp 56-57.
2. Nicolae Ceausescu, ""Speech Given in the Grand National Assembly Session," in SCINTEIA, No 12,825, 17 November 1983.
3. In this regard, see the considerations expressed in the discussion "La Guerra e la Pace" [War and Peace] in RINASCITA, No 10, 9 March 1979.
4. W. E. Colby, "What Constitutes US Strength for the 1980's," in "The 1980 Public Policy Week Papers, With Introductory Essays," AEI, Washington, D.C., 1981, p 100.
5. B. B. de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," in the JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 22 June 1978, pp 241-267; Ch. F. Doran and W. Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," in THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, No 4, 1980, pp 947-966.
6. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report to the National RCP Conference," p 64.
7. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Romania on the Path to Building a Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society," Vol 15, Politica Publishing House, 1978, p 305.
8. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Speech at the Festive Session Dedicated to the 65th Anniversary of the Creation of the Unified Romanian National State," in SCINTEIA, No 12,838, 2 December 1983.
9. D. P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," in COMMENTARY, March 1975; R. W. Tucker, "Egalitarianism and International Politics," in COMMENTARY, September 1975.
10. W. E. Colby, op cit, p 101.
11. S. Rana, "Determination of Strategic Interests," in S. Rana (ed), "Obstacles to Disarmament...", The UNESCO Press, 1981, p 55.
12. I. Kende, "Local Wars 1945-1976," in A. Eide and M. Thee (eds.), "Problems of Contemporary Militarism," Croom Helm, London, 1980, pp 261-285.

13. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report to the National RCP Conference," p 67.
14. T. Mirkovic, "L'escalade de la puissance militaire dans les relations internationales [The Escalation of Military Power in International Relations] in REVUE DE POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, Nos 774-775/1982, p 31.
15. LUMEA No 51/1982, p 30. The US secretary of defense, C. Weinberger, stated that there is need for the urgent development of certain forces that are capable of intervening in "crisis" situations far from American territory and remaining there as long as necessary (SIPRI, "The Arms Race and Arms Control," Taylor and Francis, London, 1982).
16. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Speech at the Festive Session Dedicated to the 65th Anniversary of the Creation of the unified Romanian National State."
17. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report to the National RCP Conference," p 64.

8724

CSO: 2700/108

LAW ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL

Belgrade SLUZHBI LIST SFRJ in Serbo-Croatian No 57, 4 Nov 83 pp 1581-1582

Text Law on Federal Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order

Article 1

This law regulates the scope and composition of the Federal Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order (hereafter called "Council").

Article 2

The Council examines the situation in the area of protection of the constitutional order and the issues of development and realization of the principles of the system and of the implementation of policy in this area, issues that are significant for political orientation and coordination of the work of the institutions which perform the tasks of state security and for social control of this work and other issues of importance for the security of the country.

The Council gives to the SFRJ Assembly, SFRJ Presidency and the Federal Executive Council opinions and proposals on the issues it has examined, in agreement with their rights, duties and responsibilities as determined by the SFRJ Constitution.

Article 3

The SFRJ Presidency and the Federal Executive Council can, within the framework of guidelines and positions they determine, entrust the Council with the performance of specific tasks which are in their competence and which refer to the coordination and direction of the work of federal agencies that perform the tasks of state security.

The Council is responsible to the SFRJ Presidency, viz., to the Federal Executive Council for the performance of tasks from subsection 1 of this article.

The SFRJ Presidency and the Federal Executive Council determine the way of performing tasks from subsection 1 of this article.

Article 4

The Council consists of the chairman and seven members.

The chairman and two members of the Council are appointed by the SFRJ Presidency from among its members, and one member of the Council from the ranks of officials in the institutions of sociopolitical organizations in the Federation, in agreement with these institutions.

The chairman of the Federal Executive Council and the officials who are in charge of federal agencies which perform the tasks of state security are ex officio members of the Council.

The chairman and members of the Council from subsection 2 of this article are elected to 4-year terms.

When the Council examines issues from subsection 2, article 1 of this law, representatives of the SFRJ Assembly, of the institutions of sociopolitical organizations in the Federation and of the corresponding institutions of the republics and autonomous provinces participate in its work, in agreement with the standing orders of the Council.

Article 5

The Council can request reports and other data from federal government agencies which perform the tasks of state security and which are significant for the performance of assignments and tasks from articles 2 and 3 of this law; it can get insight into the work of these agencies in other words, too, and propose, viz., undertake measures in agreement with the authorizations determined by this law.

The Council can also request reports and other data from other federal government agencies and federal organizations whose scope comprises tasks of interest for the security of the country.

Article 6

The performance of professional, administrative-technical and other work necessary to the Council is secured by the services of the SFRJ Presidency.

The Council has a secretary who is appointed by the SFRJ Presidency.

Article 7

Federal Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order, established by the Law on Federal Councils (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 66/74, 17/78 and 40/78), continues the work under the name, with the scope and with the composition established by this law.

The SFRJ Presidency will appoint the chairman and new members of the Council from article 2, subsection 2 of this law within 30 days from the day the law becomes effective.

Article 8

On the day this Law becomes effective, the Law on Federal Councils (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, no 66/74, 17/78 and 40/78) is no longer valid.

Article 9

This law becomes valid on the 8th day after the day of its publication in the SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ.

12455

CSO: 2800/152

LEGAL SYSTEM'S FAILURE TO CURB CORRUPTION DISCUSSED

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 13 Dec 83 pp 4-8

[Text] Today it is not necessary to go "among the people" to hear what people are worried about. It is sufficient to listen even to the members of one's own household, not to mention places where people gather and talk publicly or semipublicly.

People, to put it most mildly, are grumbling.

The cost of living has risen almost 50 percent, 6 days a week one sits for half an hour in cold apartments without electricity, "revolutionary patience," as somebody recently said, is being seriously tested, and to make things worse, some people who roam around are slowly reached by justice, or they are reached only if they are not powerful or smart enough to escape.

People's reaction is logical: they are demanding responsibility ever more clearly and openly.

One should, for example, listen to some workers at the Belgrade Motor Industry (IMR) when, in addition to the questions they asked Milan Kucan, a member of the CK SKJ Presidium who visited them, they addressed him with a quite specific and reasoned appraisal of some social phenomena and their opinions of specific officials and their attitudes. The broad vision and tactfulness of this official dampened some of the excessive emotions, but there are more and more such emotions. One should also hear the representatives of Self-Management Workers Controls gathered at a recent meeting in Belgrade and, for instance, Milan Obradovic from RZ SOUR Masinogradnja, who named a number of people--from the Deputy Public Prosecutor to the self-management legal officer and the secretary of the SK committee of a Belgrade commune--because they promised him a lot but did not help him at all to solve his problems. Or, in order not to keep adding other examples, let us retell what Bogdan Sunderic, chairman of the GK SSRN of Belgrade, said at the latest session of the presidency of this organization devoted precisely to the implementation of laws in the work of courts, prosecutors' offices, detection organs and various inspectorates. In the discussions we organize or which spontaneously appear in the course of political life, one of the most frequent questions asked by citizens and working people is that of the realization of constitutionality, legality, socialist moral norms, responsibility and honesty.

When for example the question of reduced consumption is raised, Sunderlic said, immediately the counterquestion is raised of irrationally used resources, as for example in FOB, Prva iskra, and responsibility is demanded. When we raise the question of health care, "almost inevitably the famous Medenica affair is brought up," when the question of agriculture is raised--to continue on our own instead of quoting Sunderic--farmers angrily retort with reproaches about speculation with agricultural money from the "green plan" spent on homes, vacation houses, automobiles. As soon as supply is mentioned, the talk turns to merchant speculators; as soon as small private industry is mentioned, there is talk about bribed tax and other inspectors. Similar things have blocked many actions. People wonder what has been undertaken in very concrete cases, are the culprits prosecuted, why are they not brought to court, but most often there is no answer.

We find many omissions, errors, irresponsibility, opportunism and inefficiency by individuals in these offices and services, errors that border on abuses and provoke ever more serious political consequences. This is why it is necessary to analyze the work of these institutions, judge what should be done right away and what on a long-term basis in order to improve the results of their work and improve their prestige, Sunderic said. Judging by the public reaction, it seems that the Socialist Alliance has concretely posed a question whose significance transcends Belgrade's borders. What does the problem consist of? What are the above-mentioned institutions blamed for?

Many things are resented. Here are some concrete remarks to very definite examples, all of which were heard at the above-mentioned session.

The public was saying all kinds of things about the Beograd-Inzenjering case for months. Even the Social Accountancy Service called attention to it, but to no avail. A lot of time passed before charges were brought up. The situation with Medenica was similar. The bill of indictment came very late. In the end, an affair of international proportions was created.

Was it necessary to wait so long?--they wonder in the Socialist Alliance. They also wonder whether, after everything, a sufficient number of facts has been investigated in this case: "Will we reach the truth and those who, directly or indirectly, made the Medenica affair possible? The court report and the deputy prosecutor's statements irritated the public again."

How is it possible that "the prosecutor admits the possibility that there are additional persons connected with this affair who were not present at the trial? Questions like this should be explained and not given to the public without any answer. It is understandable then why after each question and case the public keeps wondering which bosses might be involved but have not been touched by sanctions. If we want to protect all those who work honestly, we must proceed according to the law. Otherwise a situation is created in which people who have nothing to do with these things may be blamed. Obviously we should not have allowed this, because it leads to the invention of various plots and tales. One gets the impression that everybody knows more about individual cases than the institutions that handle them.

Similar things are happening or did happen in the above-mentioned FOB case: building and sale of apartments in Visnjicka Banja, some embezzlements, etc.

They told us in the Socialist Alliance that nobody asks these institutions to bypass the laws, and that it is not a matter of their being "more or less severe," as this is a matter of laws and legality; but that the responsibility of these institutions for efficient and responsible work is at issue. Rushing is not demanded, but unreasonable delays cannot be tolerated. "The point is that one has to work tenaciously, thoroughly and constantly. When we take all this into account, the conclusion is that the institutions responsible for indictments are more interested in political calculations and questions of who stands behind whom than in proceeding according to the law. This, of course, has necessarily weakened the efficiency of prosecutors and courts, and led to doubts in the ability to thoroughly clarify certain things and detect and punish those who commit criminal acts."

What does the "other side" say? What do the people in the prosecutor's office, court, SUP say? They defend themselves as well as they can, but also accept some criticisms.

Milos Aleksic, district public prosecutor in Belgrade, talks mostly about the problems of the competence of the prosecutor's office which, as he says, prosecutes but does not investigate criminal acts. The SUP and other offices do this. He also spoke about serious material difficulties, unsatisfactory work conditions, cramped space, low personal incomes, lack of apartments and a large volume of work. He mentioned the number of 65,000 cases in 1982. He said that they were not behind in their work: "Subjects and informations are generally solved within the legal term of 15 days after they arrive in the office, supposing that the investigation has been completed." He thinks that Belgrade Prosecutor's Office has not been too liberal, and offers data on this: out of 490 appeals submitted in the SR Serbia without the SAP, no less than 400 were submitted by the Belgrade Prosecutor's Office. He said that cooperation with sociopolitical organizations in the city is good, and that there is daily cooperation with the SUP, SDK, court and inspections. The problem, in his opinion, consists in the fact that verifications after denunciations take a long time--months, a year, or even two. In the case of the FOB, as he said, the SUP collected data for a long time, but when it submitted the report to the prosecutor's office, it was solved within 8 days. He sees the problem lying in the fact that offices charged with social self-protection do not perform well.

In relation to the criticism of weaknesses in the work of the prosecutor's office, he admitted that there were "late arrivals to or early departures from the office" but added that there were no transgressions of a moral nature, because great attention is paid to that. As for the concrete examples they were reproached with, Aleksic said that, for example, in the Beograd-Inzenjering case the public was interested in the bed in the director's office, while the prosecutor's office was interested in who took the 56 millions.

In relation to Medenica, it is said that the deputy prosecutor stated that all the responsible people had not appeared in court, but the deputy maintains

that he had not said that, according to Aleksic. Anyway, Aleksic said that nobody was shielded or protected, at least not deliberately, and asked that if somebody has some arguments he should tell them about it and then "things will be cleared up completely."

Djuro Svorcan, chairman of the Belgrade District Court, thinks that some criticism is justified but that there is unjustified criticism, too. There are manifestations of indiscipline, but there have been reactions to them, too: in 1983, 13 people were dismissed or left their jobs voluntarily. But, Svorcan warned, it is very dangerous to give a general judgment on bribery, corruption, etc. There are no such cases, or they have not been detected. The last one took place 12 years ago. Otherwise he agreed that problems must be discussed and that it is possible to change a lot, especially in manpower policy because "many jobs (476,000 cases in 9 months in 1983) were given to overburdened people and people without experience who work in the commune courts."

It is obvious that some objections that we have quoted contain, to put it mildly, a few inconsistencies and even "Rashomon" type situations, which is natural, but this is not of the utmost importance for our subject. The most important is the fact that people are willing to discuss these things thoroughly and keep working on it.

Subsequently, we talked with Zivorad Visic, secretary of the Presidency of Belgrade GK SSRN. There have been talks in the past as well as conclusions, but what will be done in the future?

"There will be several lines of action: in the City Assembly, labor union, SK city committee, the court and prosecutor's office. All of these will make a detailed and objective analysis of the work of the institutions charged with law enforcement. Problems will be analyzed and solutions found for various issues. The Presidium session raised these questions and gave a political appraisal. Concrete analysis in the above-mentioned institutions will separate the objective from the subjective, the justified from the unjustified. As for the City Assembly, it will deal with these questions this month. We will not delay it. Specific measures will be taken. We will demand that the work of these institutions should be regularly examined and controlled, their material situation examined, and that they should be helped as far as possible; but we will also demand a specific manpower policy for these institutions as well as manpower changes, above all in the management positions."

"What other benefits does this action offer?"

"The session has shown that even the most delicate issues must be discussed publicly and openly. The public is the greatest guarantee of responsibility. Closed sessions and private meetings must be avoided; one must go public with the most delicate issues. We have nothing to hide because we do not want to ruin the judges' and prosecutors' authority. On the contrary, together with them we try to preserve this authority."

This action has also shown that Socialist Alliance can, contrary to widespread opinion, move and lead on truly vital questions and do it in time, not after party committees or similar powerful institutions have done so. Judging by the reception and response of the working people, the way it has been done was well chosen. There remains, however, a certain fear of the possibility that some questions are brusquely solved in an emotional and hasty way, even though they deal with very delicate issues and institutions. There was some talk about the SUP, too, but the limits of this article do not allow us to deal with this now. That is why the recommendations of Zika Radojlovic and other discussants, that conclusions and measures should be made and taken only on the basis of a serious analysis of the problems, are understandable.

The action has shown something else, too, and we give very great significance to that: the working people have de facto promoted the whole thing. One can freely say that they have "pressed" political factors and by means of this pressure made them behave precisely as they are expected to.

Let us hope that there will be more pressure in relation to other questions, too--legal pressure through the institutions of the political system.

[Insert by Zorica Nikolic: "The Medenica Affair"]

In spite of the fact that recently in Courtroom No 3 of the Belgrade Circuit Court the last act took place in the trial of Dr Rajko Medenica, the main defendant in the case of a huge theft of funds from the Yugoslav Social Security, and other defendants, in spite of the fact that main hearings lasted 67 work days, that 147 witnesses and court experts have been heard or their statements read, that ample documentation, consisting of 5,082 pages according to the chairman of the Court Council, has been examined; in spite of the fact that this criminal-legal affair has been concluded--the truth has not been learned. The reason for this is simply that the truth about those who have made the "Medenica Case" possible has not been learned. Anyway, the public prosecutor himself stated in the final address that not all of those responsible for this case have appeared in court. Why? Some other questions have been left unanswered, too; for example, whether the indictment was changed under pressure, whether the Court Council speeded up the case, why the public has not been told the list of Medenica's clients which Medenica sent about 10 days before the end of the trial, and finally the question whether, following all these probably not accidental obscurities, a higher court in the case of an appeal will not make the same great juridical and also political mistake.

Medenica was sentenced to 20 years in prison (and to confiscation of his property as a secondary sentence), Milovan Bogdanovic to 12 years in prison, Veljko Todorovic, Branka Grujic and Dragan Simic got 2 years each, while the defendants Milovan Djokovic and Dragan Mladenovski have been found not guilty. And this is all. But the court has "found that facts have been established and that the sentences you have just heard had to be given." Punishments are severe, but the harm done is great, too: Social Security funds have been diminished by 6.5 million Swiss Francs, i.e., more than 300 million dinars. Only, is it possible that these few convicted persons in the Medenica affair

are the only ones who have deserved to be punished? This question is the main reason why--at a recent session of Presidium of Belgrade SSRN--it was even officially stated that the reports on "this trial also have irritated the public," that people are getting the impression that some things are being hushed up. Let us also say that immediately after the sentencing in Belgrade, the news arrived from Geneva (Medenica, as it is known, is in detentive prison in Geneva) that the investigative judge in that city expanded the indictment adding three responsible persons from the L'Avre hospital.

The Presidium of Belgrade SSRN had still other important reasons to put on the agenda the question of legality, jurisprudence and efficiency of our court system (the case of the Inzinjer, the FOB, some housing cases...). It is good (i.e. exact) that the statement has been made that things are being covered up, that institutions which should protect social property often remain silent, and even when they initiate legal proceedings they do it rather late, when cases have already turned into affairs. It is good that there has been open talk dealing with concrete cases about the shaken confidence of the people in equality before the law and truth and in the guarantees and security which we must have as a democratic society. It does not matter that this was the first time the efficiency of our jurisprudence, prosecution, defense and inspection service has been discussed in such a way, because better late than never. The initiative has started; what will happen later on, we will see.

Here, the same as at the end of the long trail of Dr Rajko Medenica, we are at the beginning. There are a lot of spoken and written words declaring that during its 6 months, this trial posed more persistent questions than it provided answers. Suspicions, speculations, assumptions have remained, even such that the case was hushed up in the interest of protecting some prominent people--sociopolitical workers, physicians, professors--so that one can pose the question whether they really have the prestige which is allegedly being protected. Medenica, for example, maintains among other things that he paid the expenses of their stay at Geneva for 57 heads of our delegations, but the court did not pay attention to the lists (and texts) he prepared in the Geneva investigative detention to bolster his defense, nor did the court ask for the corresponding completion of the investigative process. The defense has objected to this with very sharp words.

Who sent and paid for these delegations? This question has remained veiled in secrecy because the court did not accept proposed new testimonies. Why? This is one of the open but delicate questions in the Medenica affair.

Finally, let us say that the Belgrade court did not even say how much money from which budget went which way. It was, in fact, not even concerned with this. Perhaps the Swiss will give the answers to these questions too, yet one wonders whether they, like some of the lists, will not remain closed to the public.

Anyway, we are dealing here with the "Geneva bills," but with "our" expenses, our social security and our "men of distinction." We have had to use

quotation marks, if for no other reason than because the deputy district public prosecutor Bogdan Stankovic called the convicted person in the affair Medenica in his final address "honest and serious people"!!!

[Interview with Prof Dr Mirko Perovic by Slavko Curuvija; date and place not specified]

We have asked the following question of the 1981 AVNOJ prize winner for his commitment in the struggle for constitutionality and legality (since 1982 he has been the chairman of the Federal Court, and now a member of the Council of the Federation):

[Question] How justified is the more severe criticism of the work of the prosecution and judiciary organs, and what problems do you see in this work?

[Answer] Such criticism of jurisprudence is indeed frequent among the public, the people, and now it has begun in official meetings, too. They criticize efficiency, timeliness, but also real responsibility, i.e., appropriate application of politics through the judicial system. All these criticisms, as well as any other question, must be observed in a differentiated way. It is normal that each instrument of our society is developing and that it must look for higher forms of development. From this point of view, a critical attitude toward the court and sentencing is desirable, but one must know that jurisprudence is a part of the social system and, more closely observed, of the political system. It therefore depends on the normative and actual political systems, so that it cannot be treated separately. The problems of the political system are inevitably reflected on jurisprudence, and vice versa. If we examine the question this way, and not on the basis of a temporary attitude, which may even be emotional, although having real motives, in the various difficulties that we are meeting today (high prices, black outs, scarcity of various items), I think the following about the appropriateness of such criticism:

There is something rational in them, but also exaggerations. What I said first is rational. I know this because I have spent my life in jurisprudence. There are weaknesses in it that must be spotted and eliminated. One of them is inefficiency. There is talk about it now and it is obvious. Inefficiency is delays in finishing work, delay in judicial procedures. However, there is something in this that citizens do not notice. Namely, the court must follow judicial procedures. Our laws stipulate most democratic procedures which ensure maximal guarantees to the participants, and this sometimes lasts for years. It is true that there are possibilities of better organizing such procedures; experience has shown this. Thus the criticism about this issue is only partly justified.

As for criticism referring to the courts' penal policy, viz, criticism that courts do not judge criminal acts appropriately and that penal policy should be more severe, I think that it is not justified.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Looking at it a little deeper, in a sociological way, if you please, it must be said that problems must be solved within the total system. When

they are not solved where they should be, where they originate, then bureaucracy, administration, political circles switch them over to the courts to be solved through penal policy. The courts, however, can attack only the consequences, not the causes. Therefore I see in such criticism a dialectical error, a switching of theses. This criticism shows something else, too: political circles go into the offensive and criticize the judicial system when they should solve or direct the solution of these problems themselves. The courts cannot solve social problems. The other sectors of the system must solve them, and the courts should be the last instance.

These criticisms are thus only partly justified. I would like to condemn especially the criticism about bribery, corruption, camaraderie with attorneys. Just imagine, criticizing a judge because he is the friend of the attorney! After all, an attorney is not a speculator, an accused citizen, a foreigner. He is a lawyer, belonging to our social service, a social worker. This is a very prestigious profession in a number of western countries, and formerly also in Yugoslavia. Abroad they become members of the cabinet, but in our country not even delegates, not to speak of the fact that they cannot become cabinet members or receive an award. It is true that such a treatment provokes some negative phenomena among the attorneys, but this is our fault. I myself wanted to be an attorney, because this is closer to my temperament, but at the time it was regarded as a betrayal of the party. Just imagine, today in the Belgrade District Court attorneys are not allowed to drink coffee in the buffet together with judges. This is absurd!

Let me go back to corruption. I heard of some cases of corruption long ago, but I can tell you that instances of bribery in courts are negligibly small in relation to other milieus. I think that judicial institutions have been preserved quite well. If these institutions are being corrupted and if their morality is being eroded, this is the consequence of the general atmosphere in our society. Anyway, last year NIN citizen survey has shown that among 48 professions the judge is the most respected professional in our society. I think that this respect for the courts still exists today. It is very harmful to spread the story that each court decision can be bought. This leads to a loss of faith in jurisprudence, and I think that this is an institution trusted by people today.

[Question] You completely exonerate courts from guilt for some phenomena?

[Answer] Courts are not responsible. We have a procedural system. In it there is the public prosecutor, who is society's instrument for prosecution. When he indicts somebody, the court passes judgment. There is no trial without indictment. Whatever one may hear: Why do you not take to court this or that person, and similar things--this is not a problem for the court but for the prosecution. The prosecutor decides who will be tried.

[Question] Do you think that prosecutors pay some attention to what powerful persons or groups will say about given issues?

[Answer] I do. And they do it not a little but a lot. For example, why are names in the Medenica case not published?

[Question] Comment a little on this because such cases make people most angry.

[Answer] In all these problematic cases, the decision who will be prosecuted and tried was made somewhere outside the court. I could not tell you where it all comes from to the prosecutor. It is true that there is self-censorship, too, the fear not to incur somebody's displeasure.

[Question] You think, then, that the public is justified in its anger and feeling that in this case and in the cases of journalists' associations or sports clubs justice does not prosecute all those it should?

[Answer] I think that public anger is a little exaggerated because of insufficient information, but that it is essentially justified. However, it must be directed not only to the court but also to the system of choosing those who will be prosecuted.

[Question] It seems that you are very angry with the prosecution?

[Answer] I regard this institution very highly, I myself worked in this role, but I think that these people should perform this function autonomously, in society's interest, and not pay attention to what somebody from the SUP or party committee might tell him. Prosecutors must be more courageous, firm and decisive. Otherwise, it is clear what it leads to. Their prestige and the court's prestige suffers.

[Question] If we partly except the judges, you still support the evaluation of the Presidium of the Belgrade SSRN Conference on law enforcement.

[Answer] I think that it is good to talk about it, as we talk about other issues. One must discuss every issue and analyze the entire system. One must look for flaws and for new ways, but one must reject generalized judgments. One must analyze coolly, calmly, objectively, professionally, responsibly, and say what the weaknesses are and what should be done about them.

[Question] It is obvious, then, that something is wrong in the implementation of the law. What should this society do about it on the general and concrete levels?

[Answer] This brings us to the talk about the political system. I share the opinion of those who say that the cause of the crisis in our country is in political, not economic relations. This is why relations should be developed which respect constitutionality and legality much more. And this can be done only by means of responsibility. Thus, in my opinion, the crucial issue is the issue of responsibility. Responsibility is necessary in all its forms, juridical and above all political and social: resignations of offices, resignations of irresponsible people, replacement of incompetent people. It is necessary to pay less attention to "quotas" where they are not necessary, because they often bring incompetent people to functions for which they are not qualified.

This does not mean that the constitutional system should be changed; only its application. If it were changed in this way, together with the legal and juridical system, then everything would function better. The clue is thus in the social atmosphere and in changing the psychology of individuals who see no responsibility anywhere and say: "Nobody works, so I will not either; nobody lives honestly, I will not either; everybody steals a little--I will too!" I am exaggerating a little, but this is the atmosphere which has led from the revolutionary enthusiasm after the war, from exaltation and elation to such conditions. It is indispensable to respect the constitutionality and legality more firmly. If we have written down something, we must stick to it. Anyone who pressures or intervenes must bear the consequences--whoever he might be. Anybody in the courts should be able to tell him: Do not interfere with my business! This is not possible today. This is what we are lacking. And it is much easier to make small repairs (length of the legal procedure, etc.) than such changes.

Let me conclude: responsibility and legality are crucial issues.

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